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NEW MODES OF PLURALIST GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
GRAINNE DE BORCA,* ROBERT 0. KEOHANE,** AND
CHARLES SABEL***
This paper describes three modes of pluralist global governance. Mode
One refers to the creation and proliferation of comprehensive, integrated in-
ternational regimes on a variety of issues. Mode Two describes the emergence
of diverse forms and sites of cross-national decision making by multiple ac-
tors, public and private as well as local, regional and global, forming gov-
ernance networks and "regime complexes, " including the orchestration of
new forms of authority by international actors and organizations. Mode
Three, which is the main focus of the paper, describes the gradual institu-
tionalization of practices involving continual updating and revision, open
participation, an agreed understanding of goals and practices, and moni-
toring, including peer review. We call this third mode Global Experimental-
ist Governance. Experimentalist Governance arises in situations of complex
interdependence and pervasive uncertainty about causal relationships. Its
practice is illustrated in the paper by three examples: the arrangements de-
vised to protect dolphins from being killed by tuna fishing practices; the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the Mon-
treal Protocol on the Ozone Layer. Experimentalist Governance tends to ap-
pear on issues for which governments cannot formulate and enforce compre-
hensive sets of rules, but which do not involve fundamental disagreements
or high politics, and in which civil society is active. The paper shows that
instances of Experimentalist Governance are already evident in various
global arenas and issue areas, and argues that their significance seems
likely to grow.
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INTRODUCTION
It is by now a commonplace that international law and
world politics is less and less dominated by states even as it
becomes more and more pluralist. Tribunals such as the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, and various international criminal and human
rights courts issue binding judgments without asking the con-
sent of national courts or governments. Transnational corpo-
rations, civil society organizations, public-private partnerships,
and other non-state entities enter into agreements and build
institutions that affect the lives of people within many coun-
tries. As no formal hierarchy or other constitutional ordering
binds states and non-state actors, they freely engage with one
724 [Vol, 45:723
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another across national lines, often disregarding the jurisdic-
tion of existing international regimes, to cooperate on matters
of common or overlapping interest. The result is deep plural-
ism: the profusion within many domains of international orga-
nizations with partially complementary, but also partially com-
peting purposes, representing differing values and accounta-
ble to distinct sets of authorizing actors-to the extent they
are accountable at all.
This global pluralism is also rapidly diversifying its forms.
Even as they proliferate, international organizations link with
each other, and with firms, NGOs, and other civil society ac-
tors in novel and rapidly changing ways. These linkages can
lead international organizations to accommodate their differ-
ences and involve civil society actors in agenda setting and im-
plementation of agreements more systematically than before.
One result is that novel forms of regulation are developing
alongside more traditional forms of international law.
We argue in this paper that the concept of Experimental-
ist Governance, hitherto presented largely within domestic
U.S. legal scholarship and European Union studies literature,'
can enhance our understanding of global pluralist governance
in both law and political science.2 Experimentalist Govern-
1. See, e.g., LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Grdinne
de Bdrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (exploring the emergence of new gov-
ernance in the European Union and the United States); EXPERIMENTALIST
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TowARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE
(Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010) (discussing innovations in
E.U. governance); Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution ofExper-
imentalist Governance, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (discussing Experimen-
talist Governance in the United States); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Si-
mon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in American Public Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 53
(2011) (exploring alternatives to the "command and control" style of public
administration in the United States).
2. On pluralism in global and European governance, see Paul Berman,
Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007) (exploring legal plural-
ism and methods for managing hybridity); Paul S. Berman, A Pluralist Ap-
proach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 301 (2007) (discussing the New
Haven School of International Law, Robert Cover's work and Koh's theory
of transnational legal process); William W. Burke-White, International Legal
Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963 (2004) (arguing that international law is
being transformed into a pluralist system); Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitu-
tional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REv. 317 (2002) (exploring constitutional plural-
ism); Julio Baquero Cruz, The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist
Movement, 14 EUR. L.J. 389 (2008) (discussing legal pluralism and coming to
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ance3 describes practices that operate within a broadly plural-
ist structure of politics and law" consistent with the broad
framework of complex interdependence developed 35 years
ago in Power and Interdependence.5 In the terms used in Power
and Interdependence, state and non-state actors are both sensitive
and vulnerable to the actions of others: there is mutual depen-
dence, although it may be asymmetrical. There are multiple
state and non-state actors, linked by multiple channels of con-
tact. Direct force is not a usable instrument of power. There is
no overarching international constitutional framework with in-
stitutionalized hierarchical relations between governance units
or courts. There are areas of agreed authority, but on many
issues authority is overlapping, contested and fluid; and there
is no necessary teleological movement toward greater integra-
tion or formal constitutionalization. The concept of Experi-
mentalist Governance helps us to understand one particular-
and, we suggest, increasingly prevalent-set of ways in which
complex interdependence has become institutionalized to
cope with problems of uncertainty in which continued discord
is widely perceived as costly to all participants. Experimentalist
Governance represents a form of adaptive, open-ended, par-
ticipatory, and information-rich cooperation in world politics,
in which the local and the transnational interact through the
terms with Maastricht-Urteil). See generally Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22
LAw & Soc'v REv. 869 (1988) (reviewing the history and development of
legal pluralism).
3. The concept of Experimentalist Governance will be defined and clar-
ified more fully below in section I.C of this Article. Some of the differences
and commonalities between the literature on "new governance" in Europe,
and the literature on experimentalist governance are discussed in Gr;inne
de Btirca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction, 2010 Wis. L.
REv. 227 (2010), and in the other essays contained in the same symposium
issue, Symposium, New Governance and the Transformation of Law, 2010 Wis. L.
REv. 227 (2010). For a useful discussion of the debates on the meaning of
"new governance" in the European Union, see Adrienne Horitier and Dirk
Lehmkuhl, The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance, 28 J. PUB.
PoL'v 1 (2008), and Kenneth Armstrong, The Character ofEU Law and Govern-
ance: From "Community Method" to New Modes of Governance, 64 CUIRRENT LEGAL
PROBs. 179 (2011).
4. See generally Nico KIUSCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURAL,
IST STRUCTURE OF PosTNATIONAL LAw (2010) (exploring the alternative of
postnational pluralism).
5. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER AND INTERDEPEN-
DENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977).
726 [Vol. 45:723
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localized elaboration and adaption of transnationally agreed
general norms, subject to periodic revision in light of knowl-
edge locally generated.
Experimentalist Governance as we present it is an "ideal
type" in the sense used by Max Weber .6 Actual instances of
governance may approximate to the ideal type even while
none of them fully exemplifies it. Other governance practices
occurring within the context of more conventional integrated
international regimes, or in the relations between two more
conventional international regimes, may also partake of some
of the important elements of Experimentalist Governance
even without including all of the elements we identify as neces-
sary below. Peer review systems within the OECD, treaty-body
monitoring within the U.N. human rights system, and transna-
tional certification of environmental standards all have affini-
ties to the fully-fledged Experimentalist Governance system
embodying all five characteristics specified below. As the ex-
amples we discuss in this paper-the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, and the Montreal Protocol ("Proto-
col")-illustrate, forms of Experimentalist Governance are al-
ready evident in various arenas of global governance. We elab-
orate on the idea of Experimentalist Governance and place it
in relation to what we call "Modes One and Two," which are
characterized respectively by comprehensive and integrated
international relations on the one hand, and the proliferation
of regime complexes and governance networks on the other.
Though we consider a number of explanatory and normative
issues, this paper aspires more to raise questions than to pro-
vide definitive answers.
A key feature of contemporary world politics that contrib-
utes to the growing difficulty of constructing comprehensive,
integrated (Mode One) regimes is the increased diversity of
interests and preferences among states whose consent is re-
quired for the operation of meaningful international regimes.
Rapid economic growth in formerly poor countries has dif-
fused power: The rich states of Europe, East Asia, and North
America can no longer impose their will on others. On a vari-
ety of issues ranging from trade to intellectual property protec-
6. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 19-22 (Gunther Ross and Claus
Wittich eds., 1978).
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tion and to climate change, developing countries have mark-
edly different preferences from those of industrialized coun-
tries. We argue that this increasing diversity of preferences has
played an important role in the shift in international govern-
ance regimes from Mode One to Mode Two, and that increas-
ing uncertainty provides incentives for the development of Ex-
perimentalist Governance (Mode Three).
We also make some tentative normative observations. It
may be too early in some cases to tell whether the instances of
Experimentalist Governance operating in various global do-
mains are functioning well and adequately addressing the
global problems they were established to tackle. While their
distinctive participatory, deliberative, locally-informed, and
adaptive problem solving is normatively attractive, human in-
stitutions are easily distorted or corrupted; and unintended
consequences are common. But we believe that Experimental-
ist Governance has the potential under appropriate conditions
to be a constructive development, establishing relationships of
legitimate authority by keeping the circle of decision making
open to new participants, stabilizing expectations, and gener-
ating possibilities for effective and satisfactory problem solving
in a non-hierarchical fashion. We set out the positive case for
Experimentalist Governance in this paper without taking the
position that all of its instances are likely to operate satisfacto-
rily, or that the effects of any set of Experimentalist Govern-
ance practices will necessarily deliver positive results or be good
in normative terms.
I. THREE MODES OF GOVERNANCE
Experimentalist Governance is a relatively new, indeed in-
cipient, form of transnational governance. To understand its
significance, therefore, we must see it against the background
of more established forms of global governance: the inte-
grated international regimes of Mode One and the regime
complexes and networks of Mode Two. Our use of the terms,
"Mode One" and "Mode Two," in contrast to Experimentalist
Governance, which we present as "Mode Three," may seem to
suggest a sequence of development; but, there is no implica-
tion either that Experimentalist Governance necessarily re-
places Mode One or Mode Two Governance or even that it nec-
essarily comes later in time. Indeed, two of our examples of
728 [Vol. 45:723
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Experimentalist Governance date originally from the 1980s;
and more generally, Experimentalist Governance in some is-
sue areas may be complementary to, rather than a substitute
for, other modes of governance. Nor do we argue that these
three modes are equivalent or directly comparable. The most
familiar of the three modes is likely to be the formally estab-
lished Mode One international institutions and systems, while
the evolutions we describe as Mode Two and Mode Three ar-
rangements in many cases emerge from, build on, supple-
ment, or complement these traditional and coherent inte-
grated regimes. Our category of Mode Two institutions on the
other hand is broad, encompassing many kinds of networked
arrangement and regime complexes, whereas our Mode Three
category of Experimentalist Governance is narrower in scope
and is also likely to be least familiar to readers.
A. Mode One: Integrated International Regimes and Relations
The first mode of governance involves the creation of
comprehensive and integrated international regimes. At-
tempts at creating such institutions were made in the years af-
ter World War I, but only came to fruition with the creation of
the United Nations and its specialized agencies, along with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), at the end of
World War II. The Bretton Woods Monetary Regime (1958-
1971) is a classic Mode One institution, dominated by states
with clear rules for exchange rates and changes thereof.7 The
other prototypical international regime was the GATT, which
was later transformed into the World Trade Organization
(WTO), but regimes were created also for oceans governance,
air transport, food safety, and a wide variety of other issue ar-
eas.8
Mode One international regimes can be reasonably well-
characterized in terms of a principal-agent model: the leading
nation-states or coalitions of states can be considered as princi-
pals who create international regimes to act as their agents in
addressing and solving what are considered to be well-defined
7. See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 5, at 78-79.
8. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
(containing essays exploring the major arguments surrounding interna-
tional regimes).
2013] 729
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governance problems arising from interdependence. The
states believe that they understand the problems clearly and
they define them in advance. Their resolution is delegated to
the agents, the international organizations, to resolve accord-
ing to specific rules that they are mandated to follow.
The early Mode One institutions underwent both growth
and crisis during the first 40 years after World War II.9 They
seemed to undergo a revival from the mid-1980s until the mid-
1990s, marked by the negotiations leading to the formal
launch of the WTO on January 1, 1995, which was much more
comprehensive and integrated than the earlier GATT
launched in 1947. The Rio Conference in 1992, which estab-
lished the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), exemplified the drive to establish new issue-spe-
cific international regimes, stimulating discussion of how such
a climate regime would be linked to regimes for international
trade, forestry, and transport.
The construction of integrated and comprehensive inter-
national regimes is at the heart of what we call Mode One.
International regimes are devised in order to provide govern-
ance for areas of increased interdependence, facilitating coor-
dination by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agree-
ment and generating information about current and likely fu-
ture actions.10 These formal rules are rarely determinative: On
the contrary, powerful states can use the threat of exit to se-
cure acquiescence by others to actions that they take, contrary
to the formal rules, to pursue their own interests on issues im-
portant to them." But for most states almost all of the time
and for powerful states most of the time, the formal rules
shape feasible actions. As we will see, however, over time and
in certain contexts, the extension by these international orga-
nizations of their mandates and the expansion of their powers
beyond what could plausibly be accommodated within a prin-
cipal-agent model of accountability have led to the emergence
of novel forms of governance and administrative law.
9. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, ArTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DiscoRD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
10. See generally KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 5, at 63-162 (focusing on
international regimes in the areas of oceans and money).
11. See RANDALL W. STONE, INFORMAL GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL EcONomy 79 (2011).
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The largely state-centric nature of these international re-
gimes does not imply that they can be understood purely by
focusing on states as units. The domestic politics of powerful
states must also be understood-in a transnational context-if
we are to understand the formation and evolution of interna-
tional regimes. 12 States, furthermore, are not necessarily
united; different sub-units of the same state may well have dif-
ferent interests with respect to particular issues, and may de-
velop political strategies entailing active participation in trans-
governmental coalitions and networks involving sub-units of
other governments, sometimes in opposition to transgovern-
mental networks that include different sub-units of the same
government.13
Looking back, it is easy to see the political conditions that
facilitated the establishment of coherent international re-
gimes, both in the immediate post-World War II period and
just after the Cold War ended: namely, the concentration of
power either in one state or a small number of states with simi-
lar interests. Between 1944, when the World Bank and IMF
were created at Bretton Woods, and 1973, when the first oil
crisis shook the confidence of the West, the United States had
such dominance among Western democracies that it could ex-
ercise what has been called "hegemonic leadership."1 4 Hege-
monic leadership did not mean that the United States dictated
terms-on the contrary, it often had to revise its initial plans
and make concessions to accommodate other states-but it
did mean that it set the agenda and that nothing substantial
could be agreed without its consent. The United States was
12. See generally Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, Thearies of Inter-
national Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491 (1987) (outlining a research program
with greater focus on how "domestic political forces determine patterns of
international cooperation"); HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1997) (ar-
guing that "domestic politics and international relations are inextricably in-
terrelated"); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997) (concluding that "[r]elaxing
the assumption of unitary state behavior would support a range of 'two-level'
hypotheses about the differential ability of various domestic state and socie-
tal actors to pursue semiautonomous transnational activities").
13. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Transgovernmental
Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974); ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12-15 (2004).
14. See KEOHANE, supra note 9, at 139-41.
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clearly the most influential actor in creating institutions such
as NATO, the GATT, the World Bank, and the IMF and in
shaping their practices. The United States' enormous influ-
ence was even evident in areas without such institutions, such
as the oil trade.
There was a post-hegemonic pause in integrated regime
construction during the 1970s and 1980s, but this pause was
followed by the creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), which began operations at the beginning of 1995.
Creation of the WTO was possible because, before the rapid
economic growth of large developing countries such as China,
India, and Brazil, the global political economy was dominated
by the United States and the European Community, as the Eu-
ropean Union then was called. It took these two entities eight
years to agree on the terms of the WTO, but when they had
done so, they compelled other states' acceptance by the simple
expedient of formally abolishing the GATT and requiring
other states to accept WTO rules or be placed under restrictive
1930s tariff disciplines.' 5
By the end of the 1990s, the disappearance of the Soviet
threat and the expansion and increasing institutionalization of
the European Community had made Europe a more coherent
and independent actor in world politics. During the 1990s, the
European Community, now the European Union, had begun
to conclude major international treaties-notably the Land
Mines Treaty and the Rome Statute establishing an Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Human rights agreements such as the
Convention on Torture and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child were also instituted and strengthened during this
period, gaining almost universal membership.16 There seemed
to be hope for the further institutionalization of international
regimes-following the pattern in trade-and for building sys-
tematic connections among them. However, as we will see, it
was not long before this architectonic view of global govern-
ance through coherent institutions ceased to be plausible.
15. See Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339 (2002).
16. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HuMAN RIGHrs 256-348
(2009).
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B. Mode Two: Regime Complexes and Orchestrated Networks
From the mid-1990s on, patterns of institutionalization
changed. Newly constructed international regimes less often
received universal support: For instance, the Land Mines
Treaty and the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court were pushed to fruition largely by European
states, without support from the United States. Efforts to make
new rules for international trade under the auspices of the
WTO collapsed; a sustained effort to build a comprehensive
climate change regime, manifested by the creation of the U.N.
Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) at Rio
in 1992, also failed. The first indication of this failure came
with the Berlin Mandate in 1995, which exempted developing
countries from requirements to limit their emissions of green-
house gases; later, the United States refused to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol and Canada, having ratified, failed to comply with the
emissions limits that it had accepted. In some cases counter-
regimes were established as alternatives to, and platforms from
which to influence the development of existing international
organizations. The Biosafety Protocol, for example, was agreed
by international environmental NGOs, several European
states, and some developing countries to establish the legiti-
macy of "precautionary" regulation of genetically modified or-
ganisms, as a counterweight to WTO rules then presumed to
allow for restrictions in the trade of a product only when scien-
tific analysis conclusively demonstrated that it was hazardous.17
The period after 1995 therefore witnessed the stagnation
or collapse of attempts to develop new comprehensive and in-
tegrated international regimes, the fragmentation of estab-
lished ones, and occasional overt challenges to their authority.
This period also featured a departure from hierarchy as a
structuring principle of international organizations, and the
spread, in its place, of novel forms of networked information
exchange. This "new world order," as Anne-Marie Slaughter
has described it, is best depicted as a set of networks among
independent and interdependent entities-not just states but
sub-units of states and non-state actors.18 In a global society
17. See KRISCH, supra note 4, at 190-219.
18. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 13 (discussing the need to recognize inter-
connected networks of state and non-state actors that must be mobilized to
solve present international issues).
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linked by the internet and the social media derived from it,
the connections between entities rather than the entities or organi-
zations themselves are transforming relationships in world
politics. For example, entities now often have authority be-
cause other actors regard them as legitimate rule-makers and
therefore defer to them. Jessica Green has developed the con-
cept of "entrepreneurial authority" to refer to the construction
of authority by civil society actors without formal authorization
by or delegation from states.19 One prominent instance of en-
trepreneurial authority is the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC), which was established by civil society organizations after
the failure of inter-state negotiations made it clear that there
would be no comprehensive forestry regime.20 The FSC does
not have authority over states, but its rules are influential and
are followed particularly by firms that seek certification as pur-
suing sustainable forestry practices.
Some emergent authorities are "orchestrated," in the
sense that they are supported and coordinated by existing
(often Mode One) international organizations, seeking to ex-
tend governance beyond the point of state agreement or to
deepen the application of rules by involving other organiza-
tions and actors in their construction.21 One increasingly com-
mon form of authority, whether orchestrated by multilateral
institutions or originating in entrepreneurship by civil society
organizations, is the institution of public-private partnerships.
And indeed, since the 1990s, public-private partnerships have
proliferated and international organizations have increasingly
19. Jessica Green, Private Actors, Public Goods: Private Authority in
Global Environmental Politics Politics (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Princeton University) (on file with author); Jessica Green, Order out of
Chaos: Public and Private Rules for Managing Carbon, 13 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL.
(forthcoming May 2013).
20. See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/our-his-
tory.180.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). For criticism of the Forest Steward-
ship Council, see generally FSC-WATCH, www.fsc-watch.org (last visited Mar.
6, 2013).
21. See Kenneth N. Abbott, Public-Private Sustainability Governance, 88
INT'L AFF. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 543, 561 (2012); Kenneth N. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, International Regulation without International Government: Improv-
ing International Organization Performance through Orchestration (June 1,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487
129.
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orchestrated new forms of authority involving non-state ac-
tors. 22
The inertia of established institutions was a precondition
for much of this innovation. International regimes are difficult
to change: Changing rules generates losers as well as winners,
and binding majority voting is rare. So, even as social and po-
litical circumstances change, often at a rapid rate, regimes
neither disappear nor are radically reformed. Instead, their
rules persist but-leaving aside happy accidents when old rou-
tines serve new environments-they become increasingly obso-
lete. This process generates significant gaps between the capa-
bilities of existing institutions and the demands for collective
action of some member states or of transnational or trans-
governmental coalitions. In our heuristic model Mode Two,
institutions respond to this gap. Formerly coherent interna-
tional regimes are unable, when state preferences are diverse,
to cope with rapid changes. The result may be the formation
of other institutional arrangements not tightly linked to ex-
isting regimes, or deadlock, if states are unable to agree on a
unified set of rules and practices.
Institutional inertia and the dispersion of power and in-
terests have thus led to the emergence of a variety of govern-
ance arrangements, including regime complexes and various
internationally "orchestrated" governance arrangements.23 A
regime complex has been defined in the pioneering article on
the subject as "an array of partially overlapping and non-hier-
archical institutions governing a particular issue area."24 Re-
gime complexes have been identified in the areas of climate
change, energy, intellectual property, and anti-corruption.25
22. Liliana Andonova, Public-Private Partnerships for the Earth: Politics and
Patterns of Hybrid Authority in the Multilateral System, 10 GLOBAL ENvrL POL. 25,
25 (2010).
23. See Kenneth W. Abbott, P. Genschel, D. Snidal & B. Zangl, Interna-
tional Organizations as Orchestrators (Aug. 31, 2010) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/SGIR%2OStockholm
%20100901.pdf.
24. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources, 58 INr'L ORG. 277, 279 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Karen Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International
Regime Complexity, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 13 (2009) (defining regime com-
plexity); Robert 0. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate
Change, 9 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 7 (2011) (discussing regime complexity in
the case of climate change); Jeff D. Colgan, Robert 0. Keohane & Thijs van
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Further, one could interpret the partial fragmentation of trade
arrangements, with the proliferation of bilateral and regional
deals, and the fragmentation of monetary arrangements, as in-
dicating that regime complexes characterize these issue areas
as well. We observe that regime complexes, involving various
institutions (often including states, sub-state units, interna-
tional organizations, civil society organizations, private actors,
and others) many of which are linked non-hierarchically to
one another, have increasingly replaced more tightly inte-
grated (Mode One) international regimes.
The interstate climate change regime, in Figure 1, illus-
trates one instance of what we are calling Mode Two institu-
tions. For a more complete picture, private actors should also
be included. The circle is intended to indicate the institutions,
clubs, or networks that are focused most directly on issues of
climate change.
de Graaf, Punctuated Equilibrium in the Energ Regime Complex, 7 REv. INT'L
ORGs. 117 (2012) (describing the history of the energy regime complex);
Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, YALEJ. INT'L L. 1 (2004) (arguing
that the "expansion of intellectual property lawmaking into ... diverse inter-
national fora is the result of a strategy of a 'regime shifting' by developing
countries and NGOs that are dissatisfied with .. . TRIPS"); Kevin Davis, Does
the Globalization of Anti-corruption Law Help Developing Countries? (N.Y. Univ.
Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper No. 203, 2009) (examining the
impact that the transnational anti-corruption regime has had on developing
countries).
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FIGURE 1. THE REGIME COMPLEX FOR CLIMATE CHANGE.
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Our Mode Two category therefore includes regime com-
plexes (some of whose components may pursue divergent in-
terests), as well as networks and other novel institutions that
arise from entrepreneurial authority, or from non-hierarchical
arrangements that are orchestrated by existing international
organizations. These institutions are networked and involve
connections between independent entities. They have little in
common with the integrated regimes of Mode One that an-
swer to sovereign states.
Some semblance of continuity and normalcy is however
maintained by the diffusion in Mode Two institutions of vari-
ous forms of what has been termed "Global Administrative
Law,"26 a bundle of principles, rules, and practices derived
from or analogous to principles of domestic administrative
law, including due process, proportionality, judicial review,
and transparency. The spread of such principles and practices
reflects a broadly shared concern to protect the values of the
26. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence
of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005). See gener-
ally Global Administrative Law Project, INST. FOR INT'L LAW & JUST., http://
www.iilj.org/GAL/ (last visited May 18, 2013) (providing an overview of the
extensive literature that has grown up around this school of thought).
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rule of law associated with the democratic nation state, espe-
cially by means of the procedural devices commonly used to
induce domestic administrators to "listen" to the objections of
those subject to their decisions and generally to remain faith-
ful to the statutory mandates authorizing their action. But as
Nico Krisch, one of those scholars who initially called atten-
tion to the significance of Global Administrative Law, has ob-
served, these safeguards presuppose the existence of a unitary
(democratic) sovereign or legislator; their utility as instru-
ments of oversight depends in substantial measure on the
backstop of elections in which citizens hold their representa-
tives accountable for the way they call administrators to ac-
count. There is of course no unitary sovereign, much less an
electoral backstop in the pluralist settings of global govern-
ance. Global Administrative Law may thus under some circum-
stances make international organizations responsive enough
to diverse stakeholders to ensure their legitimacy; but its over-
all effectiveness as a safeguard of the rule of law is open to
question, at least to the extent that it hews in practice to the
domestic administrative law that inspired it.27
But in an increasingly wide range of cases, international
organizations, to be effective and legitimate, are going beyond
the accommodations of Mode Two and the procedural protec-
tions of traditional administrative law, and adopting organiza-
tional forms that allow state and non-state actors to learn, ac-
countably, from their different perspectives how to respond to
problems that none understands sufficiently to address alone.
C. Mode Three: Experimentalist Govemance
Since the distinctive feature of this Article is its focus on
Experimentalist Governance, we need to be quite specific
about what we mean by this term. Experimentalist Governance de-
scribes a set of practices involving open participation by a variety of
entities (public or private), lack offormal hierarchy within govemance
arrangements, and extensive deliberation throughout the process of de-
cision making and implementation. The ideal-type of deliberation
within an Experimentalist Governance regime entails initial re-
flection and discussion based on a broadly shared perception
of a common problem, resulting in the articulation of a frame-
27. Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 247 (2006).
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work understanding with open-ended goals. Implementation
of these broadly framed goals is then left to lower-level actors
with knowledge of local conditions and considerable discre-
tion to adapt the framework norms to these different contexts.
There is continuous feedback from local contexts, with report-
ing and monitoring taking place across a range of contexts.
Outcomes are subject to peer review, and goals and practices
are periodically and routinely evaluated and reconsidered in
light of the data gathered, the results of the peer review, and
the shared purposes. Experimentalist Governance regimes fre-
quently operate in the shadow of a background "penalty de-
fault" that penalizes non-cooperation, typically by substantially
reducing the parties' control over their fate, and thus inducing
re-evaluation of the relative benefits of joint efforts.
Consequently, five crucial identifying features of Experi-
mentalist Governance are as follows:
1. Openness to participation of relevant entities
("stakeholders") in a non-hierarchical process of de-
cision making;
2. Articulation of a broadly agreed common problem
and the establishment of a framework understanding
setting open-ended goals;
3. Implementation by lower-level actors with local or
contextualized knowledge;
4. Continuous feedback, reporting, and monitoring;
and
5. Established practices, involving peer review, for re-
vising rules and practices.
As we have noted above, various new governance arrange-
ments, including several of the pluralist governance systems we
have categorized as Mode Two, meet many of our criteria for
Experimentalist Governance. For example, transgovernmental
networks and public-private partnerships such as the Forest
Stewardship Council are typically non-hierarchical and open
to fairly wide participation; they also provide for the local im-
plementation and adaptation of transnationally-agreed frame-
work goals.28 But only arrangements that meet all five of the
28. See Christine Overdevest & Jonathan Zeitlin, Assembling an Experimen-
talist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector, REG. &
GOVERNANCE 9-11 (2012) (discussing the Forest Stewardship Council's ex-
perimentalist features).
2013]1 739
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
criteria that we have specified constitute Experimentalist Gov-
ernance in our sense. The concept of Experimentalist Govern-
ance is therefore more demanding than the broader category
of pluralistic governance processes outlined in Mode Two. We
emphasize, however, contrary to some descriptions of "new
governance" systems, that binding legal obligations or sanc-
tions for certain aspects of non-performance are not necessa-
rily incompatible with an Experimentalist Governance regime.
Mode Three or Experimentalist regimes regularize and
officialize many of the practices that Mode Two institutions
undertake sporadically. Like Mode Two institutions, experi-
mentalist institutions connect a wide range of state and non-
state actors in non-hierarchical configurations that are not
simply an informal adjunct or complement to the closed and
rule-based regimes of Mode One. But whereas Mode Two gap-
filling efforts may be thought of as ad hoc responses to unu-
sual circumstances, the Experimentalist institutions that we de-
scribe as Mode Three are premised on the understanding that
uncertainty is a persistent feature of some issue areas and that
to respond effectively, institutions must enable participants to
learn continuously to redefine the problems they face in the
very process of solving them.
Such experimentalist arrangements institutionalize the
kind of consultation and associated exercise of discretion that,
when exercised informally, are characteristic of transgovern-
mental networks. Peer review in the ideal-type of Experimen-
talist institutions is not, however, as in many transgovern-
mental networks, merely a matter of occasional exchange of
views among colleagues, part information-gathering, part coa-
lition-building. Rather, it is a mechanism both for learning sys-
tematically from diverse experience-diverse because each "lo-
cal" actor is interpreting the general problem and correspond-
ing solutions in a particular context-and for holding actors
accountable in the sense of determining whether their inter-
pretations and solutions are compelling or, at a minimum, de-
fensible given the reactions of peers in similar circumstances.
Similarly, experimentalist institutions should, ideally, reg-
ularize the kinds of organizational innovation undertaken by
Mode Two entrepreneurs and orchestrators. A common fea-
ture of Mode Two governance arrangements is that some sub-
set of an existing organization or regime with jurisdiction in a
domain tries to extend its problem solving capacity either by
740 [Vol. 45:723
NEW MODES OF PLURALIST GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
creating a novel institution or expanding its jurisdiction. Ex-
tending problem solving capacity may involve creating a pub-
lic-private partnership-to inform and so augment the capabil-
ities of the incumbents. Expanding jurisdiction may involve
creating new, competing organizational actors with a novel un-
derstanding of the domain, its problems, and possible reme-
dies. The role of the entrepreneurial or orchestrating institu-
tions is thus to instigate, from time to time, in the face of per-
sistently unmet needs, the exploration of institutional
possibilities in the domain, and, where advisable, to encourage
the creation of new organizations.
But this kind of occasional or ad hoc practice within
Mode Two arrangements is, in effect, what the guiding entities
within an experimentalist system-constituting the "center" of
such a system-should routinely do. Given that the overarch-
ing purposes of Experimentalist Governance institutions are
cast as a general framework, local units are then authorized or
obligated to contextualize these purposes in applying generally
agreed norms and practices to local contexts. Implementation
of the institution's goals will frequently involve exploration of
unforeseen particulars, the discovery both of local dead ends
and of novel, generalizable solutions, some of which may in-
deed raise questions about the originally agreed framework's
goals and ends. In organizing periodic, peer review of local
results, the central nodes of an Experimentalist Governance
system bring such findings to light, and then have responsibil-
ity for instigating the organizational reforms that they suggest.
In this sense Experimentalist institutions should routinely
orchestrate their own reform.
Put another way, the emergence of Experimentalist insti-
tutions completes and makes manifest a break with familiar
forms of principal-agent accountability. Mode One fits clearly
within a principal-agent model: Powerful states-the princi-
pals-create international regimes-the agents-to solve well
defined governance problems arising from interdependence.
The regimes are rule-based. Even though the rules officially
afford agents some administrative discretion, and informal
consultation affords them further room for maneuver at the
margins of the officially permissible, in the end there is a set of
actors ("principals" in this literature) authorized to monitor
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agents' behavior and impose sanctions when this behavior
deviates from prescribed rules.29
In Mode Two, the fragmentation of authority means that
no single set of principals (whether states or others) is able in
a comprehensive way to sanction behavior by agents. In the
regime complex for climate change, for instance, there are
sharp differences over which states should bear responsibility
for limiting emissions of greenhouse gases; the principals are
divided in ways that prevent coherent principal-agent relation-
ships from developing. The creation of public-private partner-
ships is similarly a joint confession by both parties that each is
incapable of acting unilaterally: Neither can issue instructions
except in consultation with the other. These breaches of the
strict principal-agent relationship may be inconspicuous but
they are nonetheless significant.
Going beyond this point, Experimentalist institutions, as
we will see below, routinize patterns of accountability that are
different from those underpinning the standard principal-
agent model. Uncertainty is increasingly important. Mutual
monitoring and peer review, involving elaborate processes of
consultation that are horizontal rather than vertical in struc-
ture, replace established hierarchical authority as the basis for
accountability.
Another way to think about our typology of three modes
of governance is to envisage them as arrayed on two dimen-
sions of variation. The first captures the degree of rule coher-
ence. Mode One institutions cluster at the coherent pole of
this axis: They aim to be consistent with one another and as
comprehensive or all-inclusive in their domain as possible.
Mode Two institutions cluster at the incoherent pole: They
make no pretense of regulating their entire domain and ac-
cept that the rules they make may conflict with those made by
other institutions operating in the same mode.30 The second
dimension captures the actors' beliefs regarding the degree of
uncertainty they face: whether they have sufficient knowledge
of the issue area to have clearly defined preferences over poli-
cies rather than simply over outcomes. Mode One actors clus-
29. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of
Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 29 (2005).
30. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMAcy AMONG
NATIONS 150-94 (1990) (discussing rule coherence).
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ter at the low-uncertainty pole, reasonably confident in their
ability to establish workable policies ex ante, on the basis of
current knowledge. Less confident, Mode Two actors will oc-
cupy the middle range, while Experimentalist actors, aware of
the uncertainty they face, collect at the opposite extreme. Ta-
ble 1 illustrates this point.
TABLE 1. MODES ONE, Two AND THREE: UNCERTAINTY
AND COHERENCE.
Uncertainty
Coherence Low Medium High
High Mode One
Low Mode Two Mode Three
The Experimentalist actors know broadly what outcomes
they desire-such as a cleaner environment, protection of dol-
phins and sustainable tuna fishery, or arrangements that in-
clude and empower disabled people while respecting their au-
tonomy; but initially they are uncertain about how to obtain
these objectives. This difference is reflected in a fundamental
difference in the understanding of what rules are. Mode One
and sometimes Mode Two institutions aim to fix precise, bind-
ing, and definitive rules to give effect to their policy prefer-
ences. Experimentalist institutions, aware of current and per-
haps persistent limits on their foresight, set provisional goals
and establish procedures for periodically revising them on the
basis of peer review of the diverse experience of the actors at-
tempting to realize them. Because Experimentalist institutions
encourage local autonomy and contextual responses to diverse
situations, they will tend towards the "incoherent" pole of the
integration-fragmentation dimension; but this diversity, in ad-
dition to accommodating the particulars of local circumstance,
serves broad, joint exploration of possibility. It is not a sign of
clashing, irreducibly plural understandings of the world. As
another way of schematically summarizing this discussion, we
present Table 2, which succinctly defines each Mode of Gov-
ernance, indicates the major period in which such entities
have been created (without implying a strict time demarcation
7432013]
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or a linear progression), and provides three prominent exam-
ples of each Mode.
TABLE 2. THREE MODES OF GOVERNANCE.
Governance Major
Mode: Definition: periods: Examples:
One. Comprehensive, 1945- Bretton Woods
integrated Monetary System, Air
international regimes Transport Regime,
WTO
Two. Regime complexes: 1995- Regime Complex for
multiple, non- Climate Change,
hierarchical sets of Public-private health
institutions regime complex
Three. Experimentalist 1995- Inter-American
Governance: Tropical Tuna
institutionalized Commission, UN
network patterns Convention on the
Rights of Persons
with Disabilities,
Montreal Protocol on
Substances Depleting
the Ozone Layer
To illustrate how Experimentalist Governance works in
practice, we now discuss three examples of this mode of gov-
ernance: the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
and the Montreal Protocol on Substances Depleting the
Ozone Layer.
II. EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN ACTION: THE INTER-
AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION AS AN
EXPERIMENTALIST REGIME
The purpose of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Com-
mission (IATTC) is to maintain tuna stocks in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific while minimizing the death of dolphin by-
catch.31 Its origins and organization exemplify the characteris-
tically experimentalist co-development of organizational struc-
ture, problem definition, and solutions (and the changes in
31. See INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, http://www.iattc.
org/HomeENG.htm (last visited May 18, 2013).
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the parties' understanding of their interests and objects which
all this supposes) under the continuing influence of back-
ground penalty defaults in the form of draconian trade sanc-
tions.32
The regulatory problem arose because in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific, herds of dolphins accompany schools of tuna
swimming below them. Starting in the late 1950s large fishing
vessels began to use the dolphin herds, easily visible on the
surface, to locate tuna in international waters, and then encir-
cle the school with huge purse seine nets which draw shut at
the bottom-a technique known as dolphin sets. Dolphins do
not abandon the tuna and, absent precautions, drown when
the fish are hauled aboard.
Public concern about dolphin mortality contributed to
pressure in Congress for passage of the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act (MMPA) in 1972. This legislation obligated the
U.S. tuna fishing fleet to reduce serious harm to dolphins to
"insignificant levels approaching a zero . . . rate. "33 The legisla-
tion also required placement of observers on board vessels to
ensure compliance with equipment and practice require-
ments, and with fleet-wide mortality limits.3 4 The Act addition-
ally banned imports of tuna catch that involved "incidental kill
or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of
United States standards."35
As part of its efforts to enforce implementation of the
MMPA internationally, the National Marine Fisheries Service,
an agency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration, in consultation with the Department of State, sought
the collaboration of the IATTC. The IATTC was founded as an
intergovernmental fisheries management commission by
coastal states in 1948 and had, in the mid-1970s, long-standing
relations to the key actors in the industry. But the IATTC also
had the familiar, tragedy-of-the-commons problems of deep-
sea fisheries, where, in the absence of property rights, each
user has an incentive to exploit the resource before others do,
32. This case study draws significantly on the account of Richard W.
Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What
We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENvrTL. L. REv. I
(1999).
33. Marine Mammal Protection Act §101, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (2) (1972).
34. Id. §114(e).
35. Id. §101 (a) (2).
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with overfishing as the result. This combination of capacities
and debilities (exacerbated by the need for external support
in enforcing quotas) made the IATTC the forum of choice for
the U.S. dolphin protection initiative. Beginning in 1976 it or-
ganized programs to place observers on tuna vessels (at the
IATTC's expense, and initially without enforcement powers).
The observers were to collect data on fishing techniques and
dolphin mortality, estimate trends in dolphin populations, in-
vestigate possibilities for reducing mortality, and disseminate
information regarding best practices with dolphin sets to ves-
sel captains and crews. But participation in the crucial ob-
server operations remained minimal until the MMPA was
amended in 1984 to require exporters to demonstrate compli-
ance with a regulatory system "comparable" to that in the
United States, a requirement that the Fisheries Service deter-
mined would be automatically met by participation in IATTC
observer program.
Broad participation in the observer program produced a
flood of information that reshaped existing understandings of
both the problem and the solution. Between 1985 and 1986,
the first year of reliable observation, the estimate of dolphin
mortality caused by the non-U.S. fleet increased from 40,000
to 112,000 dolphins. It was also discovered that dolphin mor-
tality could be very significantly reduced by using simple tech-
nologies for releasing dolphins from closing nets, and by
avoiding certain bad practices, such as setting nets on unusu-
ally large herds of tuna or dolphin, in new areas, beginning at
sundown and continuing into the dark, in the presence of
strong sub-surface currents, or with faulty gear.3 6 In the years
following these discoveries, the IATTC systematically inter-
viewed the fishers to learn what techniques did and did not
work, and diffused this information to the fleet in workshops,
thus becoming "a fleet-wide clearinghouse of information on
dolphin mortality reduction gear, techniques, and experi-
ence."37
But promising new practices were not implemented until
there was a credible threat of a penalty default, once more in
the form of trade sanctions. Public awareness of the disparities
in mortality rates between the U.S. and foreign fleets led to
36. See Parker, supra note 32, at 28.
37. Id. at 28-29.
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further 1988 amendments of the MMPA that placed an em-
bargo on imports of Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna from any
country without a precisely defined regulatory program closely
keyed to the latest U.S. practice and a kill rate "comparable" to
that of the U.S. fleet. Thus qualifying regulatory programs
had to, for example, prohibit "sundown sets," as did U.S. law;
foreign fleet kill rates, after a one-year grace period, could not
exceed the U.S. rate by more than 25 percent; and observers
had to accompany all foreign as well as U.S. vessels. After pas-
sage of the amendment there was a dramatic increase in the
frequency of IATTC dolphin mortality reduction seminars and
the number of attendees. 39
This process of both ensuring compliance with the ex-
isting program and learning to improve mortality-reducing
practices by monitoring the actions of individual vessels and
systematically disseminating the findings was codified in the
1992 La Jolla Agreement signed by Mexico, Venezuela, the
United States, and other coastal flag states, with the support of
many NGOs. 40 The Agreement committed signatories to an In-
ternational Dolphin Conservation Program that would pro-
gressively reduce dolphin mortality in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean. Overall dolphin mortality in the fishery was to be
capped by 1999 at less than 5,000, with each "qualified vessel"
allocated a pro rata share of the total. Every vessel capable of
deploying dolphin sets was required to carry an observer to
monitor dolphin mortality, and half the observers were to be
nominated by the IATTC. The Agreement also created an Im-
plementation Review Panel composed of IATTC staff, six dele-
gates from signatory states, and two representatives each from
industry and NGOs. The 1992 La Jolla Agreement was offi-
cially non-binding, but all signatories have complied with it,
and data show that there has been a reduction of mortality
rates to levels below the best previously achieved by the U.S.
fleet. Despite U.S. Congressional legislation to ban imports of
tuna caught using dolphin sets, the La Jolla Agreement sur-
vived as fleets based primarily in Mexico and Venezuela sold
their catch to Latin American and E.U. markets whose con-
38. Id. at 30.
39. Id. at 31.
40. Id. at 47.
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sumers are environmentally conscious but not insistent on
complete protection of dolphins.41
The IATTC regime exhibits the five features that define
experimentalist regimes. Though the regime was created at
the instigation of the United States, participation was open to
those who identified themselves as relevant stakeholders:
NGOs (some of which played a crucial role in achieving the La
Jolla Agreement), fleet owners and crews, and flag states. The
initial goals of the regime-preservation of Eastern Tropical
Pacific tuna stocks and protection of dolphins-were broad and
open ended (no one had precise ideas of how to accomplish ei-
ther) and their relation to one another unknown. Methods for
achieving these goals, and a clarification of the trade-offs in-
volved in their pursuit, were only established by continuous
monitoring and reporting of implementation of best current
practices by lower-level actors-the on-board observers. That
is, decision making was not hierarchical: It responded more to
local experience than to the prior preferences of major states.
Indeed, the LaJolla Agreement was negotiated to institutional-
ize the regime without relying on the support of the U.S. re-
view of local implementation, and the elaboration of proposals
41. The success of the La Jolla Agreement is all the more striking be-
cause in the years immediately preceding it (and following the discovery of
the high mortality rate of foreign fleets), Earth Island, a U.S.-based NGO,
had campaigned successfully among canners and in Congress for complete
protection of dolphins through an outright ban on tuna harvested by
dolphin sets; only tuna caught by other techniques could be labeled
"dolphin free" and imported into the United States. But, as had long been
known, alternative fishing methods spared dolphin at the cost of ensnaring
large numbers of juvenile tuna, thus reducing the reproductive capacity of
the fishery and speeding depletion of stocks. The campaign divided the
movement to regulate the fishery, with environmental groups including The
World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, and The Environmental Defense Fund
joining the IATTC in taking an "environmental" perspective that gave prior-
ity to defense of the whole ecosystem, while Earth Island and its allies in
Congress (given a free hand by the migration of much of the U.S. fleet to
skipjack fisheries in the Western Pacific) made protection of dolphins their
exclusive goal. See Parker, supra note 32. In recent proceedings brought
before the Appellate Body by Mexico (which was compliant with the LaJolla
agreement) against the United States in July 2012 (Tuna II), the labeling
requirement imposed by the United States was found to be discriminatory
and unjustified. Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Concerning
the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 1 299, WT/
DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012).
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for improvement was organized by the IATTC. As a result of
this continuous monitoring, emerging rules and practices were
subject to revision through processes of peer review. The interplay of
on-board observation and concerted evaluation of results by
the IATTC was indispensible to defining the scope of the prob-
lem, in identifying a general approach to a solution, and im-
proving the techniques for implementing it.
Yet these processes of Experimentalist Government were
by no means purely consensual and free from the constraints
and dynamics of power. On the contrary, penalty defaults, in
the form of trade sanctions that threatened fleets from non-
compliant countries with loss of the U.S. market for tropical
tuna, were indispensible both to the creation of the monitor-
ing regime and to the broad implementation of the measures
it suggested. Indeed, the threat of trade sanctions to induce
deliberative formation of regimes has become a common de-
vice for establishing Experimentalist international organiza-
tions. Experimentalist Governance in such circumstances
clearly takes place within the shadow of power and against a
backdrop of coercive alternatives.
III. THE REGIME OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AS AN EMERGENT
EXPERIMENTALIST REGIME
Although the domain of human rights protection may at
first sight appear an unlikely candidate for Experimentalist
Governance 42 and many other human rights treaties do not
operate in a particularly experimentalist way, the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in-
cludes many provisions characteristic of an experimentalist sys-
tem. 3 Each of the five features of experimentalism we have
42. See Grdinne de Bfirca, EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?, in
LAw AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 97 (Grdinne de Brca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Gr-dinne de Bilrca, New Modes of Governance and the
Protection of Human Rights, in MONITORING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU
25 (Philip Alston & Olivier De Schutter eds., 2005).
43. See Grdinne de B~irca, The European Union in the Negotiation of the U.N.
Disability Convention, 35 EUR. L. REv. 174 (2010) (exploring the E.U.'s role in
the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and
its impact or otherwise on the experimentalist nature of the Convention).
For a reading of the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) which shares many of the understandings of ex-
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outlined above is present in the architecture of the regime es-
tablished in 2008 when the CRPD came into force.
In some ways the CRPD is similar to conventional interna-
tional human rights treaties. It sets broad goals (e.g. promot-
ing and ensuring full and equal enjoyment of all human rights
and fundamental freedoms of all disabled persons), and fol-
lows these with a series of eight overarching general principles:
respect for dignity, full participation and inclusion, non-dis-
crimination, respect for difference, equal opportunity, accessi-
bility, gender equality, and respect for the evolving capacities
of children.44 These in turn are followed by an extensive series
of positive and negative obligations on states to ensure the full
realization of the rights of disabled persons.45
However, a number of more unusual provisions and fea-
tures of the CRPD add significantly to its experimentalist char-
acter.46 Examples of these novel provisions are: (i) the central
role accorded to civil society organizations-in this case
mainly disabled persons' organizations (DPOs), other NGOs,
and national human rights institutions (NHRIs)-in all as-
pects of the Convention's drafting, implementation, decision
making, monitoring, and operation; (ii) a specific provision
requiring national implementation and monitoring, with a cen-
tral role for national institutions, to complement the more
traditional provisions on international monitoring; (iii) an ob-
ligation on states to collect relevant data; and (iv) a provision
for the holding of a substantive annual conference of the par-
ties. Other features of the CRPD also resonate with the prem-
ises of Experimentalist Governance, in particular the open-en-
ded and flexible nature of many of its provisions.4 7
perimentalism, see Judith Resnik, Comparative (In)equalities: CEDAW the Juris-
diction of Gender, and the Heterogeneity of Transnational Law Production, 10 INT'L
J. CONST. L. 531 (2012).
44. U.N. Convention on tie Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 1, 3,
Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD].
45. Id., art. 4.
46. See, e.g., Fr6d6ric M6gret, The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic
Conception ofRights, 12 INTLJ. HUM. RTs. 261 (2008) (analyzing the novelty of
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as a human rights
instrument).
47. See TaraJ. Melish, The U.N. Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong
Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14 Hum. RTs. BRIEF 37, 45 (2007)
(commenting on the relevance of the flexibility in the CRPD that "the Com-
mittee carefully avoided 'shopping lists' and over-specification of details and
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Recall the five key features of Experimentalist Govern-
ance as we have defined the term: openness to participation of
relevant entities; the establishment of a framework under-
standing setting open-ended goals; implementation by lower-
level actors with local or contextualized knowledge; continu-
ous feedback, reporting, and monitoring; and established
practices, involving peer review, for revising rules and prac-
tices. All five of these Experimentalist features pertain to the
CRPD.
A. "Open Participation"
The CRPD's emphasis on ensuring the participation of
persons with disabilities was not only evident in the negotia-
tion and drafting of the Convention itself, but also animates
many of its substantive provisions.48 The impetus to ensure
standards as an agreed operational modality in the drafting process. It did so
precisely to ensure that the Convention's text would remain relevant and
vital over time and space, capable of responding to new challenges and
modes of abuse as they arose, as well as the vastly different challenges faced
by States at different levels of development. It also wished to avoid the nega-
tive inference that anything not expressly included in a detailed provision
was intended to be excluded. Thus, broadly exemplary terms with inclusive
references and a higher level of generality were consistently preferred to
overly-specific, narrowly-tailored ones or 'lists' of abuse and standardized im-
plementing measures. The choice and design of precise implementing mea-
sures is properly left to the discretion of States, in consultation with civil
society and informed by the processes of constructive dialogue and informa-
tion sharing envisioned by the supervisory framework established under the
Convention.").
48. See CRPD, supra note 44, pmbl. (m) (recognizing the enhanced sense
of belonging that will result from full participation of persons with disabili-
ties); id. pmbl. (o) (noting that persons with disabilities should have an op-
portunity to participate in decision-making processes that directly concern
them); id. pmbl. (y) (stressing that promotion and protection of the rights
of persons with disabilities would promote their participation in society); id.
art. 3(c) (making full participation one of the guiding principles of the Con-
vention); id. art. 4(3) (obligating the involvement of persons with disabilities
in development and implementation of legislation and policies to imple-
ment the Convention); id. art. 24(1) (c) (ensuring the right to education to
enable full participation of persons with disabilities in society); id. art. 24(3)
(ensuring full and equal participation in education); id. art. 26(1) (b) (pro-
viding habilitation and rehabilitation services which ensure participation
and inclusion in the community and all aspects of society); id. art. 29 (ensur-
ing participation in political and public life); id. art. 30(5) (encouraging and
promoting participation in recreational, leisure and sporting activities); id.
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such inclusion of disabled persons derived in part from the
growing influence of the social model of disability that
emerged during the civil rights movement in the United
States, was institutionalized in the Americans with Disabilities
Act in 1990, and gradually diffused internationally.49 The so-
cial model of disability contrasts with the more traditional
medical model of disability, in emphasizing that the disadvan-
tages which arise from the variation in the physical, mental,
and emotional characteristics of human beings are the conse-
quences of avoidable social and relational impediments. The
prominent place given to NGOs and NHRIs during the lead-
up to and in the drafting of the Convention, and their influ-
ence on many governments, help to explain the reliance of
the Convention on this progressive social model, rather than
the traditional medical model that underpinned the disability
law and policy of many states.
The Convention itself was drafted with extensive partici-
pation on the part of persons with disabilities and other ex-
perts on disability, in all aspects of its negotiation and draft-
ing.50 Further, since the Convention came into force, the em-
phasis on participation in so many of its provisions has been
used to substantial effect by DPOs and other NGOs.5 1 While
art. 32(1) (involving civil society and NGO participation in international co-
operation); id. art. 33(3) (including civil society and DPOs in monitoring
implementation of Convention); id. art. 34(4) (including persons with disa-
bilities in the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).
49. The slogan adopted by Disability NGOs was "Nothing about us with-
out us." See, e.g., JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT Us WITHOUT Us: DIsA-
BILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 3 (1998) ("As Ed Roberts, one of the
leading figures of the international DRM, has said, 'If we have learned one
thing from the civil rights movement in the U.S., it's that when others speak
for you, you lose.'").
50. See Melish, supra note 47, at 37.
51. The information on which this and other parts of the account below
are based is drawn from a series of interviews conducted in September and
October 2012 with a range of key DPOs and other participants active in the
international disability regime including: (1) Janina Arsenjeva, European
Disability Forum; (2) Regina Atalla, President of RIADIS, (the Latin-Ameri-
can network of organizations for persons with disabilities and their families);
(3) Alexandre Cote, Capacity Building Program Officer, International Disa-
bility Alliance; (4) Amy Farkas, Disability Section, Programme Division,
UNICEF; (5) An-Sofie Leenknecht, Human Rights Officer, European Disa-
bility Forum; (6) Ron McCallum, Chair of the CRPD Committee; (7)
Amanda McRae, Disability Rights Researcher at Human Rights Watch; (8)
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they continue to be vocal critics of the reluctance of states to
fully implement various requirements of the Convention,
these organizations have actively embraced the many opportu-
nities provided for their central involvement in the new disa-
bility regime, often to challenge the stance of states. DPOs and
the umbrella groups and networks which coordinate many of
them play central roles in monitoring and data-gathering, as
well as continuing in their traditional roles of advocacy, cri-
tique, and mobilization.
In countries with established independent monitoring
mechanisms under Article 33(2) (which is discussed further
below), civil society groups generally have a seat at the table,
and in countries such as Spain, the designated monitoring
mechanism is actually a DPO umbrella group. Civil society
groups in many countries also submit information to their gov-
ernments. Although many governments are reluctant to seek
or incorporate this feedback into their periodic reports to the
CRPD Committee (hereinafter the Committee of Experts), the
civil society groups' submissions nevertheless serve as relevant
inputs to the Committee.52 At the regional and international
levels, civil society groups are trained to prepare shadow re-
ports to the Committee of Experts, and other organizations
Victoria Lee, Human Rights Officer responsible for U.N. Treaty Bodies at
the International Disability Alliance; (9) Lauro Purcil, Philippine Coalition
on the U.N. CRPD; (10) Ana Sastre Campo, CRPD Delegate, CERMI (DPO
umbrella organization and independent monitoring mechanism in Spain);
and (11) Marianne Schulze, Chairperson of the Austrian Independent Mon-
itoring Committee.
52. See Telephone Interview by Alyson Zureick with An-Sofie Leenknecht,
Human Rights Officer, European Disability Forum (Oct. 12, 2012) (noting
that in Belgium the government only gave civil society groups a short period
of time to comment on the draft initial report); Interview by Alyson Zureick
with Marianne Schulze, Chairperson of the Austrian Independent Monitor-
ing Committee (Oct. 16, 2012) (noting that, in Austria, the government only
gave civil society three weeks to comment on the draft National Action Plan,
though civil society still managed to submit more than one hundred com-
ments over a longer period); Interview by Alyson Zureick with Amanda Mc-
Rae, Disability Rights Researcher, Human Rights Watch (Sept. 11, 2012)
(noting that the Croatian government only consulted their allies within civil
society when drafting their initial report); Interview by Alyson Zureick with
Regina Atalla, President, RIADIS (Sept. 12, 2012) (noting that Brazilian
NGOs sent several letters to the government with feedback for the State's
initial report and never received a response).
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also conduct capacity building activities.5 3 Capacity building is
increasingly viewed as an important investment in ensuring
that civil society organizations understand the CRPD and are
able to participate actively in its implementation, monitoring,
and evaluation. 54
B. "A Framework Understanding and Open-ended Goals"
Whether to include a precise definition of disability was a
controversial issue in drafting the Convention. An Experimen-
talist approach to lawmaking emphasizes the importance of
flexibility and revisability in the interests of adaptation to
change and inclusiveness, which militates against the inclusion
of a precise definition of disability. A traditional human rights
approach, on the other hand, tends to be much more skepti-
cal of this kind of flexibility, seeing it as an opportunity for
states to evade real commitments. Consequently, many NGOs
argued for a precise definition of disability, primarily to avoid
the exclusion of certain disabilities by states parties in their
internal policies and laws. And indeed, it seems that there was
concern on the part of government delegations to avoid being
too detailed and prescriptive in this way, for precisely these
kinds of reasons.55
53. The European Disability Forum also conducts capacity building on
monitoring and reporting with its member organizations in Europe. Inter-
view with An-Sofie Leenknecht, supra note 52. RIADIS, a network of Latin
American NGOs and DPOs, conducts capacity building activities with civil
society groups and is in the process of establishing an online platform for
civil society to share information and best practices with each other. RIADIS
had, at the time of writing, conducted 14 regional seminars and trained
1,800 leaders on the Convention. Interview with Regina Atalla, supra note 52.
There are similar regional networks in Asia and Africa. Interview by Alyson
Zureick with Alexandre Cote, Capacity Building Program Officer, Int'l Disa-
bility Alliance (Sept. 28, 2012); Interview with Marianne Schulze, supra note
52.
54. Tunisia has been cited as one example where grassroots groups
joined together to create a new DPO, which includes all of the different
disabled persons groups in the country. Unlike the DPOs of the Ben Ali
period which were primarily focused on service provision, the new organiza-
tion is focused on human rights advocacy per se. Telephone Interview by
Alyson Zureick with Victoria Lee, U.N. Human Rights Officer, U.N. Treaty
Bodies, Int'l Disability Alliance (Oct. 4, 2012).
55. See Andrew Byrnes, The Proposed U.N. Draft Convention on the Human
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: What's in it, and What Isn't?, AusTRAUAN
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The compromise ultimately agreed upon avoided a pre-
cise definition of disability. A provision on the meaning of dis-
ability was included in the first article of the Convention on
"purposes" rather than in the second article on "definitions."
Article 1 includes the following sentence: "Persons with disa-
bilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, in-
tellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with va-
rious barriers may hinder their full and effective participation
in society on an equal basis with others."5 6 The approach
adopted here clearly follows the social rather than the medical
model of disability,57 and fits with the premises of an Experi-
mentalist Governance approach, adopting an inclusive and
open-ended definition.
Article 2 of the CRPD similarly adopts a broad and inclu-
sive definition of discrimination in the following terms:
"Discrimination on the basis of disability" means any
distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of
disability which has the purpose or effect of impair-
ing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exer-
cise, on an equal basis with others, of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, ec-
onomic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.58 It
includes all forms of discrimination, including denial
of reasonable accommodation; "Reasonable accom-
modation" means necessary and appropriate modifi-
cation and adjustments not imposing a dispropor-
tionate or undue burden, where needed in a particu-
lar case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the
enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.59
Two aspects of this definition are of particular note from
an experimentalist perspective. The first is the breadth of the
definition of discrimination, including both intentional and
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (Mar. 25, 2004), http://www.hreoc.gov.au/dis-
ability-rights/convention/byrnes_2503.htm.
56. CRPD, supra note 44, art. 1.
57. See also id. pmbl. (e) (" [r] ecognizing that disability is an evolving con-
cept and that disability results from the interaction between persons with
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others").
58. Id. art. 2.
59. Id.
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unintentional (impact-based) discrimination, even while not
using the language of "direct" or "indirect." The second nota-
ble feature is the inclusion of denial of reasonable accommo-
dation as part of the definition of discrimination. This formu-
lation fits well with premises of experimentalism in its flexibil-
ity and adaptability to need and circumstance, describing both
the wrong (denial of reasonable accommodation) and the
remedy (provision of reasonable accommodation) in the same
terms.
C. "Implementation by Lower-level Actors" with "Continuous
Feedback, Reporting and Monitoring"
Here we discuss together the third and fourth compo-
nents of our definition of Experimentalist Governance: imple-
mentation by lower-level actors and continuous feedback and
monitoring. There are two parts to the monitoring system es-
tablished by the CRPD: a more conventional international
human rights treaty-monitoring Committee of Experts, and a
novel provision for national monitoring, which includes the
participation of DPOs and other civil society actors.
Articles 34-39 of the CRPD establish a fairly standard in-
ternational human rights monitoring mechanism with a Com-
mittee of Experts6O empowered to monitor compliance with
the Convention through receiving, examining, and respond-
ing to state reports and reporting to the U.N. General Assem-
bly and Economic and Social Committee, with a slightly more
controversial individual right of complaint to the Committee
contained in an Optional Protocol. 61 A novel provision of the
Convention, however, is that it mandates inclusion of persons
with disabilities in the membership of the Committee of Ex-
perts.62 At the time of writing, 15 of the 18 members of the
Committee are persons with disabilities.6 3 According to one
60. What renders this traditional international mechanism somewhat dis-
tinctive in the CRPD context is that Article 34(4) requires consideration to
be given to the inclusion of persons with disabilities on the Committee. This
has since been done and the Committee of 17 experts is composed of vari-
ous individuals with disabilities.
61. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities art. 1, Dec. 13, 2006, 2518.
62. CRPD, supra note 44, art. 34(4).
63. Interview by Alyson Zureick with Ron McCallum, CRPD Comm.
(Sept. 13, 2012).
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knowledgeable observer, the participation of persons with dis-
abilities and civil society members in the Committee itself has
significantly changed the culture of the Committee and its will-
ingness to engage actively with civil society, as compared with
other human rights treaty bodies.64
Civil society organizations currently have a robust rela-
tionship with the Committee and interact formally and infor-
mally with its members through a number of forums. As in
other U.N. human rights treaty monitoring arrangements, na-
tional, regional, and international civil society organizations
are active in submitting parallel reports to the Committee
prior to its review of a particular State's report. The Interna-
tional Disability Alliance (IDA), which is the network of global
and regional DPOs, trains local organizations to submit
shadow reports to the Committee and has worked closely with
civil society organizations in the Philippines, India, and El Sal-
vador to prepare shadow reports.65 Committee members rely
on civil society parallel reports to provide a more complete
picture of a State's compliance with the CRPD, and to help
them formulate questions to states during the reporting pro-
cess.66
Civil society representatives also attend the Committee
sessions held in Geneva twice a year.67 IDA organizes side
events during these sessions that allow Committee members to
interact with DPO representatives from the countries under
review, and is quite proactive in ensuring wide participation. 68
The side events normally take place prior to the Committee
hearings and are aimed at briefing the Committee on a state
which is coming up for review. These are generally private side
events which are not open to the attendance of States but only
to civil society, NHRIs, and U.N. agencies. When DPOs in Tu-
nisia were unable to attend Tunisia's review before the Com-
mittee, IDA representatives traveled to Tunisia to gather infor-
64. Interview with Amanda McRae, supra note 52.
65. Interview with Alexandre Cote, supra note 53.
66. Interview with Ron McCallum, supra note 63.
67. See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities - Sessions, UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Sessions.aspx
(last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (listing the dates of previous Committee sessions).
68. Interview with Alexandre Cote, supra note 53; Interview with Victoria
Lee, supra note 54.
2013] 757
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
mation to present to the Committee members on behalf of the
organizations. 6 9 IDA also held a workshop in Hong Kong in-
cluding both Chinese and Hong Kong DPOs to assist them in
preparing an anonymous submission to the Committee prior
to China's review.70 Civil society organizations are thus able to
provide feedback to the Committee before the adoption of the
so-called "List of Issues" and before the State appears before
the Committee for its official review.71 The Committee also ac-
tively welcomes the inclusion by States of persons with disabili-
ties on their reporting delegations, and it seems that almost all
States now make sure to have persons with disabilities on their
delegations.72
The second and more obviously novel aspect of the moni-
toring and implementation regime established by the CRPD is
the provision in Article 33 on mechanisms for independent
national monitoring and implementation.7 3 Clearly this em-
phasis on domestic or local implementation and monitoring,
rather than relying primarily on a somewhat remote periodic
review by an international body, conforms to a central tenet of
Experimentalist Governance. Although the U.N. Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) preferred
to seek an integrated monitoring body on the U.N. level, 7 4
other states indicated that they did not want a typical U.N.
monitoring mechanism, which they considered to be a recipe
for failure. Consequently, some of the NGOs and NHRIs sug-
gested a number of innovative ideas, including: a monitoring
role for NHRIs; national focal points; and the inclusion of
69. Interview with Victoria Lee, supra note 54.; Interview with Ron McCal-
lum, supra note 63.
70. Interview with Victoria Lee, supra note 54.
71. Interview with Alexandre Cote, supra note 53; Interview with Victoria
Lee, supra note 54.
72. Interview with Ron McCallum, supra note 63.
73. CRPD, supra note 44, art. 33.
74. This was apparently influenced by a series of debates which took
place in the 1980s and 1990s, leading to the recommendation for an inte-
grated, consolidated monitoring system. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Final
Report on Enhancing the Long-term Effectiveness of the United Nations
Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74; CHR 53d Sess.
(Mar. 27, 1997) (by Philip Alston); U.N. Secretary-General, Effective Implemen-
tation of International Instruments on Human Rights, including Reporting Obliga-
tions under International Instruments on Human Rights: Note by the Secretary Gen-
eral, U.N. Doc. A/44/668 (Nov. 8, 1989).
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stakeholders in the monitoring mechanism.7 5 Ultimately, both
NGO groups and NHRIs played a significant role in the discus-
sions and helped to ensure that the implementation mecha-
nisms for the CRPD were not held hostage to the broader and
more difficult debate about reform of the U.N. Treaty-body
system more generally.76
The provision which emerged from these discussions, Ar-
ticle 33 of the Convention, introduces the idea of "focal points"
by providing that states parties shall "designate one or more
focal points within government for matters relating to the im-
plementation of the present Convention" and also provides for
the establishment of a coordination mechanism within govern-
ment.77 This proposal was promoted during the negotiation of
the Convention by NGOs and the NHRIs, and is consistent
with the provision in Article 33(3) that civil society and, in par-
ticular DPOs, are to be fully involved in the monitoring pro-
cess. Article 33 also assigns a key role to NHRIs in the elabora-
tion of the Convention by providing that state parties shall
"maintain, strengthen, designate or establish .. . a framework,
including one or more independent mechanisms . . . to promote,
75. Another somewhat innovative element in the monitoring mechanism
was the provision in Article 36(4) (inspired by a similar provision in the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child) on the transparency and broad avail-
ability and accessibility of the comments and suggestions of the international
monitoring committee in response to state reporting. CRPD, supra note 44,
art. 36(4).
76. See Marianne Schulze, Effective Exercise of the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities: National Monitoring Mechanisms in GLOBAL STANDARDS-LOCAL Ac-
TION-15 YEARS VIENNA WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTs 217 (Wolf-
gang Benedek, et al. eds., 2009).
77. Article 33(1) provides that: "States Parties, in accordance with their
system of organization, shall designate one or more focal points within gov-
ernment for matters relating to the implementation of the present Conven-
tion, and shall give due consideration to the establishment or designation of
a coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related action in
different sectors and at different levels." CPRD, supra note 44, art. 33(1). It
seems that this provision was not initially well understood, and in particular
that states parties implementing the Convention did not understand the dif-
ference between a focal point and a coordinating mechanism, and that dif-
ferent parties are interpreting the provision on a suitable focal point quite
differently from one another.
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protect and monitor implementation of the present Conven-
tion."78
National implementation and monitoring is also empha-
sized elsewhere in the Convention.79 Taken together, the Con-
vention's monitoring and implementation provisions empha-
size the crucial relationship between the international frame-
work and the national level, and the extent to which the
practical realization of the commitments contained in the
Convention will depend on the constant engagement of inde-
pendent actors. Following the logic of Experimentalist Gov-
ernance, the framework commitments themselves take shape
and are fleshed out through the interaction of the domestic
and the international levels, bolstered by constant informa-
tion-gathering, feedback, and scrutiny.
It is also clear that these novel provisions of the Conven-
tion have been brought to life in practice by the involvement
of the various stakeholders.80 The combination of mandating
focal points, recommending that state parties establish coordi-
nation mechanisms to facilitate action around the CRPD
across government departments, and the requirement in Art
33(2) for independent monitoring mechanisms, have, in con-
junction with one another, had significant effects. The domes-
tic monitoring mechanisms, which are required by Article
33(2) to include "one or more independent mechanisms,"81
78. CPRD, supra note 44, art. 33(2) (emphasis added). Article 33 makes
indirect although not explicit reference to the so-called Paris Principles on
the status of independent national human rights institutions, which was
adopted by a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly in 1993. See G.A. Res.
48/134, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Mar. 4, 1994), available at www2.
ohchr.org/English/law/parisprinciples.htm.
79. Article 16(3) of the Convention requires states to ensure that all facil-
ities and programs designed to serve persons with disabilities are effectively
monitored by independent authorities. CPRD, supra note 44, art. 16(3). Arti-
cle 31 (1) provides, "States Parties undertake to collect appropriate informa-
tion, including statistical and research data, to enable them to formulate and
implement policies to give effect to the present Convention." Id. art. 31(1).
See also id. art 33(3).
80. The information which follows is drawn from the series of interviews
conducted in September and October 2012. See supra note 51.
81. This term is widely understood to refer to the National Human
Rights Institutions whose criteria were established by the U.N. Paris Princi-
ples of 1993. See, e.g., Meredith Raley, The Paris Principles and Article 33.2 of the
CPRD, DISABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTs (Oct. 11, 2011), http://disability-
andhumanrights.com/2011/10/11/the-paris-principles-and-article-33-2-of-
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carry out a range of functions. They provide information and
feedback to the government when the government is drafting
its reports to the CRPD Committee or when drafting their own
parallel reports, they advise governments on compliance of
new or proposed legislation with the requirements of the Con-
vention, and they organize public meetings- to include civil
society actors and others-on the operation of the Conven-
tion.
D. "Peer Review and Practices for Revising Existing Rules
and Practices"
In addition to the peer review, which takes place regularly
in the context of the reporting and monitoring system of the
Committee of Experts, the CRPD provides, in Article 40, that
"the States Parties shall meet regularly in a Conference of
States Parties in order to consider any matter with regard to
the implementation of the present Convention."8 2 It is unu-
sual for an international human rights treaty explicitly to man-
date such regular meetings, and for such meetings to include
substantive rather than merely procedural discussions. Article
40 was strongly advocated by NGOs during the drafting of the
Convention. The model which the NGOs had in mind for a
substantive annual conference was apparently inspired by a
similar provision in the Ottawa Landmines Convention, in
which the annual conference plays a particularly important
role because. there is no independent monitoring provision
provided for in that Treaty.83 Although the CRPD has an inter-
national monitoring mechanism (the Committee of Experts)
with an optional individual complaints procedure, Article 40
was nevertheless "designed to allow States Parties to meet regu-
the-crpd/ (explaining that Article 33(2) was drafted with NHRIs in mind);
Statement by the ICC of NHRls, DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FOR MENSCHENRECHTE,
http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/en/monitoring-body/state-
ment-by-the-icc-of-nhris.html (last visited May 18, 2013) (stating that "Article
33(2) of the CPRD recognizes this important role and function of indepen-
dent NHRIs").
82. CRPD, supra note 44, art. 40.
83. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Produc-
tion and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Dec.
12, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; Melish, supra note 47, at 46.
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larly to discuss best practices, difficulties, needs, and other
matters regarding implementation of the Convention."84
The annual Conference focuses on a different theme
each year, and is organized around a series of talks by States
Parties and thematic panels.85 In addition to providing for the
election of new CRPD Committee members, the Conference
also enables civil society organizations to network with each
other, to place issues on the agenda, and to share experiences
and best practices in relation to the monitoring and imple-
mentation of the Convention. It appears that the most interest-
ing critical thinking and discussion take place during the side
events. These are organized at the annual conference of states
parties and are generally open to all to attend, including
states. Civil society's role has largely been facilitated through
IDA, which organizes the Civil Society Forum that takes place
the day before the conference begins and works with the U.N.
Department of Economic and Social Affairs in selecting the
theme, panels, and speakers for the conference.8 6
It is clear that the new regime established by the CRPD is
an interesting novelty compared to other international human
rights systems. The central involvement of key stakeholders in
all aspects of the Convention's operation has transformed it
into a dynamic regime for bringing about relevant social and
political change for persons with disabilities. In addition to the
extensive stakeholder involvement, the iterative nature of the
regime and the regular interaction between the local, na-
tional, and international levels in its implementation and op-
84. Melish, supra note 47, at 46.
85. The 2012 theme was "Making the CRPD Count for Women and Chil-
dren." Conference of States Parties, UNITED NATIONs ENABLE, http://www.un.
org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1535 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). See generally
Fifth session of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, 12-14 September 2012, UNITED NATIONs ENABLE, http:/
/www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=46&pid=1595 (last visited Oct.
20, 2012) (referencing the draft agenda for the Conference).
86. See Interview with Victoria Lee, supra note 54 (explaining which side
events are private and which are open to States); Interview with Amanda
McRae, supra note 52 (stating that the IDA organizes the Civil Society Forum
that takes place the day before the Conference); Interview with Regina
Atalla, supra note 52 (noting that the IDA organizes the Civil Society Forum
at the conference); Interview with Alexandre Cote, supra note 53 (stating
that the IDA is closely associated with the organization of the conference
and thus sending a strong message about civil society's role).
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eration have given it a degree of effectiveness and momentum
that has been lacking in some of the other human rights re-
gimes.87
IV. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT
DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER AS AN
EXPERIMENTALIST REGIME
Our third exemplar of Experimentalism is the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The re-
gime created under the auspices of the Montreal Protocol has
led to a striking reduction in the production and emissions of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting sub-
stances (ODSs); it is widely regarded as one of the most suc-
cessful of all international environmental regimes. The agree-
ment is distinctive in that many of its principal architects and
proponents assumed that developments in science would con-
tinue to shape the Protocol's goals and that failure to comply
with its eventual requirements was more likely to result from
misunderstanding of its terms, or incapacity to meet obliga-
tions under them, rather than from self-interest. In accord
with this "managerialist" perspective on compliance, the re-
gime was designed from the start to be comprehensive and
adaptive-able both to respond to changing understandings
of threats to the ozone layer, and to assist signatory states to
develop the capacity to perform as required. But, with few ex-
ceptions, even the advocates of the Protocol did not anticipate
the extent to which the institutionalized interplay between
ground-level problem solving and the reconsideration of goals
and methods for achieving them-key features of Experimen-
talism, induced by but not foreseen in the initial design-
would be the key to the regime's success.8 8
A. The Origins of the Problem
Concern that pollution of the atmosphere could disrupt
the stratospheric ozone layer, increasing human exposure to
ultraviolet rays and thus the risk of skin cancer, along with
87. C.f Resnik, supra note 43 (discussing the comparable evolution of
the CEDAW regime).
88. See Owen Greene, The System for Implementation Review in the Ozone Re-
gime, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL COMMITMENTs 89, 118-24 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).
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changes in climate, arose in the late 1960s. The initial focus
was on the risks associated with nitrous oxide and water vapor
emitted in the exhaust trails of high-flying, supersonic aircraft
then entering service or being designed. Further research
quickly drew attention to possible interactions between ozone
and chlorine and bromine, especially the chlorine in CFCs
used as refrigerants, propellants for aerosols, and as mild sol-
vents for cleaning metal parts and circuit boards, and the bro-
mine in halons used in fire extinguishers and agriculturally im-
portant biocides. The chemical inertness that made these mol-
ecules attractive in many settings allowed them to remain
intact as they mixed upward into the stratosphere, where expo-
sure to intense sunlight split them into components, initiating
the destructive interactions with ozone.
Public and political reaction to scientific conjecture about
this connection was abrupt and emphatic. Sales of aerosol cans
in the United States, having grown at an average annual rate of
25% during the preceding two decades, dropped by 25% in
1975 as information about the consequences of CFCs became
widespread. A Federal Interagency Task Force was created to
determine the location and extent of federal authority to regu-
late CFCs, beginning a process that would result, after two
years, in ajoint rule-making by the Federal Trade Commission,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Con-
sumer Safety Protection Commission essentially banning CFCs
as aerosol propellants.89 Even before this rule came into effect,
moreover, the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act re-
quired the administrator of the EPA to commission biennial
studies of the ozone layer by the National Academy of Sciences
and to regulate any substance that "may reasonably be antici-
pated to effect the stratosphere, especially ozone in the strato-
sphere, and such effect may reasonably be expected to endan-
ger public health or welfare."90
89. See Edward A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND
STRATEGY 35-42 (2003).
90. Id. at 59; Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671n (West
1990) (stating, "[i]f, in the Administrator's judgment, any substance, prac-
tice, process, or activity may reasonably be anticipated to affect the strato-
sphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, and such effect may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, the Administrator shall
promptly promulgate regulations respecting the control of such substance,
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But efforts by U.S. activists and officials-in alliance with
Canada, some of the Nordic countries, and the United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP)-to secure international
support for the ban on aerosols, and for regulation of ozone-
depleting substances generally, failed in the following decade.
The European public and NGOs outside the Nordic countries
and the Netherlands did not by and large react with the same
immediate alarm as their U.S. counterparts.9 1 Through the
early 1980s continuing research on the stratosphere was incon-
clusive,92 and production of CFCs stagnated,93 suggesting that
the problem, if any, might be self-limiting. European produc-
ers of CFCs, led by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) of
Great Britain, suspected-incorrectly, as would soon be
demonstrated-that their U.S. competitors already had devel-
oped substitutes and that they were seeking to secure a com-
petitive advantage through an international ban. ICI's views
got sympathetic hearing in official circles not only in Great
Britain but also in other producer countries such as France
and Italy. Even in the United States the tide of regulation was
ebbing. Reagan's victory in the 1980 elections put appointees
with an anti-regulatory agenda at the head of the EPA. At
about the same time DuPont, a global chemical company, took
the lead in forming the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy,
grouping large producers (with substantial scientific and legal
resources) and many small user firms (which together pro-
vided a grass-roots constituency that could influence Congres-
sional decisions) in a coordinated effort to limit or entirely
block additional controls.94
But this reversal proved temporary. Worldwide produc-
tion of CFCs, after declining in the 1970s, began to grow again
after 1982, largely for non-aerosol uses. Better understanding
of the kinetics of reactions involving chlorine, nitrous oxide,
and ozone confirmed initial conjectures about the vulnerabil-
ity of the ozone layer and intensified concerns of accelerated
depletion.9 5 Improvements in measurement instruments, in-
practice, process, or activity, and shall submit notice of the proposal and
promulgation of such regulation to the Congress.").
91. See PARSON, supra note 89, at 43.
92. See id. at 125.
93. See id. at 125.
94. See id. at 58.
95. Id. at 66-74.
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cluding the use of satellite data, led to more reliable estimates
of ozone concentrations, established that there were no natu-
ral "sinks" to absorb CFCs, and gave the first indications of a
decreasing trend in ozone levels, including evidence of an
ozone "hole" above the Antarctic.96 The authoritative, "blue
books" study by NASA and the World Meteorological Organi-
zation-commanding credibility because it involved essentially
all the leading figures in the debate-found after an exhaus-
tive review of the data and modeling projections that even a
three percent annual increase in world output of the chemi-
cals would likely lead to dangerous depletion of the ozone
layer.97 A change of course in the Reagan administration
brought pro-regulatory appointees back to the EPA.98 Industry
changed its position as well: After a senior DuPont manager
revealed that the company had ceased development of promis-
ing substitutes for CFCs in 1981 because the products were
under the then prevailing conditions not commercially viable,
the alliance of producers and users of CFCs endorsed a "rea-
sonable global limit on the future rate of growth" of CFC emis-
sions, as large increases would be "unacceptable to future gen-
erations."99
Proponents of international regulation could now plausi-
bly argue that the alternative to an agreement might well be
unilateral U.S. action in the form of restrictions in trade in
ODSs. As in the case of the tuna-dolphin regime originating in
the same period, the threat of trade sanctions created a pen-
alty default that brought vacillating parties to negotiate.
B. The Emergence of the Regime
In 1985 the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer established a general obligation to promote co-
operation by means of systematic observations, research and
information exchange on the effects of human activities on
the ozone layer and to adopt legislative or administrative mea-
sures against activities likely to have adverse effects on the
ozone layer, but no specific requirements were at this stage
agreed. The key measure to protect the ozone layer was the
96. See id. at 75, 84-85.
97. See id. at 103-04.
98. Id. at 133-37.
99. See id. at 123, 126.
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subsequent Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention, ne-
gotiated and opened for signature in 1987, which came into
force in 1989. Besides setting an initial schedule for the reduc-
tion and eventual elimination of CFCs and halons (with excep-
tions made for "essential" uses for which no substitutes could
be found), the Protocol set out in spare terms the core ele-
ments of a regime for extending and modifying protective
measures. 00 The parties were to apply certain control mea-
sures, which they were to re-assess every four years in light of
the currently available scientific, environmental, technical,
and economic information, as determined by panels of experts
in each of these domains.10' To permit verification of their
performance, parties were to report annual production, as well
as imports and exports of regulated chemicals, using 1986 as
the baseline for evaluating reductions in output.102 Trade in
controlled substances with countries not party to the Protocol
was tightly restricted. Developing countries, defined as those
annually consuming less than 0.3 kilograms of controlled sub-
stances per capita, were authorized to defer control mea-
sures.103
A multilateral fund (Fund), financed by the developed
countries, was established to meet "all agreed incremental
costs" that developing countries would incur in complying
with control measures, and to provide technical assistance to
them in doing SO.1 0 4 Arrangements were later made to sup-
port, through the Global Economic Fund administered by the
World Bank, compliance efforts by countries with economies
in transition-Russia and former states of the Soviet Union-
that had trouble meeting their obligations but did not qualify
as developing countries.105 At the urging of the U.S. delega-
tion, the parties established a committee to determine non-
compliance with the Protocol's provisions and to propose re-
100. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 316.
101. Id. art. 6.
102. Id. art. 7.
103. Id. art. 5, 1 1.
104. Id. art. 10, 3.
105. See, e.g., RIcHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DiRE,
TIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 276-86 (2d ed. 1998) (detailing how the
Global Economic Fund and other agencies supported countries transformed
by political, economic, and social changes).
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sponses.106 The meeting of the parties, to be held at regular
intervals, retained broad authority to review implementation
of the agreement, add or remove substances from the annexes
specifying controls and adjust control measures, and oversee
the quadrennial assessments. A secretariat was established to
provide administrative assistance to the parties, especially in
the preparation of meetings and the collation and distribution
of data reported under the agreement.
All of these components are indispensible to the system-
atic operation of the regime; and the shadow of power-in the
form of the threat of trade sanctions, and the denial of fund-
ing from the Global Economic Fund to transition economies,
as well as the threat of sanction by the E.U. against member
states that did not comply with data reporting requirements-
was indispensible to overcoming blockages, especially in the
early stages of implementation. But the Technology and Eco-
nomic Assessment Panel, established as part of the quadren-
nial review apparatus, and the sector-specific Technical Op-
tions Committees operating under it, as well as the multilateral
fund are of particular interest here because together they
came to institutionalize the broad stakeholder participation,
revisability of goals, and continuous learning from the moni-
toring of performance that defines an experimentalist organi-
zation.
Thus, the principal function of the Technical Options
Committees is to determine, in sectors ranging from solvents
to refrigerants to halon fire-extinguishing agents, the feasibil-
ity of finding substitutes for ozone-depleting substances cur-
rently in use. They effectively set the schedule for application
of restrictions, and establish exemptions for "essential" uses if
formally requested to do so through the Technology and Eco-
nomic Assessment Panel by a party to the Protocol. In denying
such requests, the Technical Options Committees must pro-
vide detailed explanations of the reasons and a guide to meet-
ing the requirement.107 Doing all this in turn requires joint
exploration of innovative possibilities by producers and users
106. See Patrick Szell, Implementation Control: Non-compliance Procedure and
Dispute Settlement in the Ozone Regime, in THE OZONE TREATIES AND THEIR IN-
FLUENCE ON THE BUILDING OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMEs 43, 45
(Winfried Lang ed., 1995).
107. Greene, supra note 88, at 96-100.
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of ozone-depleting substances in the sector. To limit the risks
of capture associated with such collaboration, formal member-
ship on Technical Options Committees is limited to represent-
atives of user industries and groups, and of regulators and
standard setters. Actual investigation, however, involves joint
efforts by working groups of users and producers, including
plant visits, pilot projects with regular exchanges of informa-
tion on progress, and so on.' 08
The effectiveness of such efforts is especially evident in
two sectors where observers least expected it: solvents for in-
dustrial use and halons for fire extinguishers. Thus, for exam-
ple, the solvents Technical Options Committee found that
AT&T and a small firm had developed an environmentally be-
nign solvent for cleaning circuit boards based on terpenes, a
chemical previously ignored by both electronics producers
and large producers of CFCs. 09 Similarly, a group of Techni-
cal Options Committee experts on a site visit observed a Ger-
man machine that soldered in a controlled-atmosphere cham-
ber, limiting oxidation of the joint, and so the need for fluxes
and the expensive cleaning of parts and equipment with sol-
vents after their use; user firms then agreed to buy the ma-
chine and exchanged reports on improvements to it."o The
Halons Technical Options Committee, largely composed of
experts in military and civilian fire fighting, found that more
purposive tests that did not require release of halons and bet-
ter management of halon banks would substantially reduce
production and emissions of the substance. The cumulative ef-
fect of such institutionalized problem solving was to induce
the regulated actors to produce and continuously update the
information regulators needed to establish and periodically
adjust rules that are both public-regarding and feasible)"
108. See id. at 96-97 (indicating that Technical Options Committee mem-
bers are overwhelmingly selected from entities that use ozone-depleting sub-
stances or ozone-depleting substance regulators and standard setters); PAR-
SON, supra note 89, at 173-96 (detailing the efforts of different industry sec-
tors in both decreasing the use of ozone-depleting substances and finding
alternative chemicals); id. at 197-244 (detailing the instrumentality of Tech-
nical Options Committees in different sectors in providing the data and gui-
dance necessary to advance negotiations to phase out ozone-depleting sub-
stances).
109. PARSON, supra note 89, at 189.
110. Id. at 189-90.
111. See id. at 191-92.
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Once this process establishes initial regulatory goals, the
targets have to be translated into concrete plans for disman-
tling or repurposing particular ozone-depleting substance pro-
duction facilities, and for building plants to manufacture sub-
stitute products. The largest of these projects could run into
the tens of millions of dollars; for a large economy the conver-
sion costs run into the hundreds of millions. Efforts of this
scale and complexity overtaxed the financial and technical ca-
pacities of developing countries; the risks of corruption inher-
ent in such projects were especially acute there as well. The
multilateral fund (in tandem with the Global Economic Fund)
was designed to address these limits by providing project fi-
nance and technical support-including support for building
local technical capacity-and overseeing implementation.
But it was soon clear that to achieve these goals the multi-
lateral fund would have to develop its own institutional capaci-
ties and those of its national counterparts. The Fund is admin-
istered by four implementing agencies-the World Bank, the
United Nations Development Program, the United Nations In-
dustrial Development Organization, and the U.N. Environ-
mental Program-reporting to an executive committee, whose
composition and voting rules promote consensus by giving de-
veloped and developing countries group veto powers, and ulti-
mately to the Meeting of the Parties. In the early years,
projects were approved individually and implementing agen-
cies acted essentially as advocates for national partners, with
the Secretariat taking the lead in monitoring and project eval-
uation. Even in those years, informative debates resulted in im-
portant changes in producer countries' plans and reconsidera-
tion in the Meeting of the Parties of rules on the production,
use, and export of controlled substances in developing coun-
ties.' 12
During the 1990s a more comprehensive system emerged,
enabling funders and recipient countries to better monitor
program design and execution and to improve performance
of particular projects and the organization of the decision
making process. To receive Fund support, a developing coun-
try was henceforth required to establish a national ozone unit
to collaborate with one or more Implementing Agencies and
must prepare a national program, with detailed sectoral plans
112. Greene, supra note 88, at 102.
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and a national regulatory framework, for phasing out produc-
tion and use of ozone-depleting substances.113 This framework
is frequently revised in the light of experience, as a World
Bank report put it, plans "should be flexible enough to allow
incorporation of findings and experience gained from the
early phases of programs to improve the effectiveness of the
strategies or the program over time."114 Both the Implement-
ing Agencies and the national ozone units face continuing
pressure for innovation as attention shifts to non-point-source
polluters: small and medium sized firms using CFCs and farms
using methyl bromide, a general-purpose biocide for which
there is no single, generally applicable substitute.
The cumulative effect of all this institutional development
was to produce, over the course of the 1990s, a highly decen-
tralized regime, with connections with the public and private
sectors-often down to ground level actors-in countries all
over the world, and making substantive and procedural rules
that are at once mandatory and subject to frequent revision.
Figure 2, taken with slight modification from Greene, presents
a schematic overview."i 5
113. See World Bank, Case Study, The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation
of the Montreal Protocol x-xi (2004) [hereinafter World Bank Case Study];
Jimin Zhao & Leonard Ortolano, The Chinese Government's Role in Implement-
ing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Montreal Protocol, 175
CHINA Q. 708, 714 (2003).
114. World Bank Case Study, supra note 113, at 7.
115. Greene, supra note 88, at 93.
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Ozone Regime, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECrVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTs 89, 93 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).
These institutions are marked by the "close link" between
(sub)systems "for reviewing implementation, responding to
implementation problems, and revising and developing rules
and institutions"-links that are seen as key to the Protocol's
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ability to extend to meet demanding phase-out targets while
extending the control regime to new domains.116 Experimen-
talist institutions are designed to establish just such links,
which are by nature non-hierarchical. Higher level rule revi-
sion in light of local rule application depends on local levels
having sufficient autonomy to report defects in the rules they
observe and to explore alternatives. This rule revision also re-
quires authority of the center or apex of the organization to be
sufficiently limited that it must take account of local experi-
ence.117 It is therefore not surprising that the bureaucratic
apex of the Montreal Protocol, the Secretariat, plays a coordi-
nating role but has little or no directive authority. It acts pri-
marily as a "hub," generally performing information-pooling
functions that facilitate exchanges between the center and lo-
cal units. 118
Two leading managerialist proponents of the Montreal
Protocol, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes, had different
expectations. They appreciated that in view of scientific uncer-
tainty, international environmental regimes like the Montreal
Protocol would have to adapt continuously to changing de-
mands. But, influenced by the organizational models of their
day, and particularly the experience of the most successful ad-
ministrative agencies in the United States, they assumed that
such adaptation required a robust, centrally placed secretariat
to make sense of information that overtaxed the capacities of
the parties. Indeed, their recommendation to parties building
regimes for the international regulation of the environment
116. See Greene, supra note 88, at 120; see also DAVID VICTOR, GLOBAL
WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING
THE PLANET 219-224 (2011) (discussing the success of the Protocol).
117. The authorities at the apex of a hierarchy can, in principle, change
ineffective rules, but in practice the only way the higher-ups are likely to be
alerted to the need for such changes is by reports of subordinates, whose
incentives to demonstrate compliance with rules, regardless of their effec-
tiveness, will inhibit such reporting.
118. A recent study of the bureaucracies of nine international environ-
mental organizations-ranging from the UNEP, the OECD environment di-
rectorate, the International Maritime Organization, the environmental de-
partment of the World Bank to the Global Environment Facility-found the
Montreal Secretariat to be by far the smallest of them all, employing only six
to eight program officers, including the executive secretary and its deputy.
Steffen Bauer, The Ozone Secretariat 2 (Global Governance Working Paper
No. 28, 2007), available at http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/WP28.pdf.
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was blunt: "[D]elegation of authority to a central body with
sufficient staff and resources to manage the implementation of
[treaty] obligations."" 9
The success of the Montreal Protocol vindicates many as-
pects of their understanding of international problem solving,
above all their intuition that regimes had the potential to play
an active role in "modifying preferences, generating new op-
tions, persuading the parties to move toward increasing com-
pliance with regime norms, and guiding the evolution of the
normative structure in the direction of the overall objectives of
the regime."12 0 But the actual organization of the Montreal
systems shows as well that the regime ultimately took a very
different institutional form from the one assumed to be most
adaptive.
V. UNSUCCESSFUL OR PSEUDO-EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE
Attempts to create Experimentalist Governance are not al-
ways successful. In some situations actors have sought to create
arrangements intended, at least by some, to approximate the
ideal type of Experimentalist Governance; but for a range of
reasons, including political disagreement, its opposite (an ex-
cess of shared confidence that the essentials of the solution are
already understood), entrenched veto-positions, or a limited
commitment to fuller participation, they have failed to do so.
Such failures often generate governance arrangements that
have some of the architectural features of Experimentalist
Governance, but ultimately do not meet our criteria for func-
tional Experimentalist Governance systems or practices. To
put it in Weberian terms, they are insufficiently close to the
Experimentalist Governance ideal-type exemplified in our
three case studies for us to regard them as approximations of
the model. It is important to point to failed efforts to institu-
tionalize Experimentalism to underscore that this form of or-
ganization is not an automatic and inevitable response to all
situations marked by diversity and uncertainty: Experimental-
119. Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes & Ronald B. Mitchell, Man-
aging Compliance: a Comparative Perspective, in ENGAGING COUN-
TRIES-STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL Ac-
CORDS 39, 61 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold Jacobson eds., 1998).
120. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 229 (1995).
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ism appears to work well only under some additional condi-
tions. It is, moreover, especially important to distinguish these
"pseudo-experimental" situations from the genuine article
since otherwise the performance failure of pseudo-experimen-
talist organizations could be taken, incorrectly, as falsifying
some of our general arguments about the functioning and
promise of Experimentalist Governance. In this section we
briefly present three such cases. In the next, generalizing from
these examples, we discuss four conditions that make success-
fully functioning Experimentalist Governance more likely, al-
though we do not put forward a fully elaborated theory of
those possibility conditions.
One of the salient cases in which formal veto powers have
led to a pseudo-experimentalist outcome is the International
Labor Office (ILO). The ILO was created after World War I as
part of a global movement to ban sweatshops, in which labor is
overworked and exploited. In the ensuing decades the ILO
agreed on many detailed conventions regulating, for instance,
the minimum age of seafarers or the organization of hiring
halls for them, and established procedures for annual review
by experts of the Parties' compliance with their obligations
under the convention, including suggestions for improvement
in both the conventions and the national performance.121
Outwardly, the ILO seemed like a model of an adaptive inter-
national organization, and Chayes and Chayes referred to it as
such in illustrating the possibilities of a managerialist ap-
proach to treaty compliance.122
But by the mid-1990s it was clear to many in the ILO that
the combination of convention and annual review was ineffec-
tive. The conventions were often too detailed to be applicable
in a wide range of cases; the experts lacked the kind of on-the-
ground knowledge that was necessary for probing and inform-
ative reviews; their reports were in any case typically ignored.
In response, the leadership of the ILO tried to introduce "new
governance" reforms that, had they worked, could well have
resulted in Experimentalist Governance. Conventions were
consolidated as "core standards," NGOs were to be drawn into
121. For a list of these Conventions, see Conventions, INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/Pp=1000:12000
:0::NO::: (last visited May 18, 2013).
122. CHAYEs & CHAYEs, supra note 120, at 230.
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the review process, and countries were to develop plans for
addressing systematic problems and were to receive technical
assistance in implementing them, all as part of a new govern-
ance scheme.123
The reforms however failed, largely because of the tradi-
tional tri-partite governing structure of the ILO. As a recent
paper puts it:
The efforts of the ILO leadership have been waylaid
by the organization's corporatist structure, which
gives employer associations and trade unions veto
power over policy developments at a time in which
these actors are increasingly unable to agree on con-
crete policy measures.' 24
In short, despite many of the basic features of Experimentalist
Governance, such as the articulation of framework goals, the
involvement of civil society, and the establishment of an itera-
tive system for monitoring and reviewing implementation of
the goals over time, the ILO's attempt at Experimentalist-style
reform failed because of the veto-position of the two key stake-
holders within the internal governance structure of the ILO,
and their unwillingness to allow NGOs and civil society organi-
zations to speak for workers and other enterprises in contexts
in which the traditional corporatist actors were absent. 125
Failed or pseudo-experimentalism can also result from in-
formal actor preferences, rather than the exercise of formal
veto powers. Examples are found among the cluster of institu-
tions established by the European Union under the rubric of
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to coordinate and
learn from innovations in policy in domains such as employ-
123. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Stan-
dards, IrTr'L ECON. PoL'Y BRIEF, July 2000; Philip Alston, "Core Labour Stan-
dards" and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 457 (2004).
124. Lucio Baccaro & Valentina Mele, Pathology of Path-Dependency? The
ILO and the Challenge of New Governance, 65(2) INDUs. & LAB. REL. REv. 195,
195 (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article=2096&context=ilrreview. See also Kenneth Abbott, Philipp
Genschel, Duncan Snidal & Bernhard Zangl, IOs as Orchestrators 22-23
(Aug. 31, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stock-
holm.sgir.eu/uploads/SGIR%2OStockholm%20100901.pdf.
125. See Baccaro & Mele, supra note 124 (discussing the downfalls of the
organization's corporatist structure).
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ment and the organization of the labor market. The formal
resemblance of the OMCs to Experimentalist Governance is
striking: The E.U. Council of Ministers sets framework goals;
countries review their national and subnational policies;
benchmarks and indicators of progress are agreed upon; coun-
tries submit action plans showing how they are progressing, or
not, and remedial actions are proposed.
But outcomes have diverged significantly among OMCs,
depending largely on the actors' disposition to allow others
into the decision-making processes. In the European Employ-
ment Strategy OMC, designed to improve the operation of the
labor market, well-established groups such as trade unions
blocked efforts to make participation more open and also lim-
ited the extent of their own contribution to the process they
had helped create. In the Social Exclusion OMC, formed to
improve life chances for marginal groups, NGOs representing
the excluded had much less access to decision makers to begin
with, so they participated wholeheartedly. In short, whether or-
ganizations sought inclusion depended substantially on
whether they already had access to the policy-making pro-
cess.126
A surfeit of agreement among key actors can frustrate at-
tempts to establish Experimentalist Governance as much as
overt or covert disagreement. A case in point is the Poverty
Strategy Reduction Program (PRSP) of the International Fi-
nancial Institutions (IFIs). 127 The architecture of the PRSP has
the familiar experimentalist elements: the setting of broad
framework goals, the delegation of responsibility and discre-
tion to local units and actors (also known as "country-owner-
ship") to implement these broad goals in diverse settings, the
formal commitment to broad participation, and to revision in
the light of experience. But the central actors-IFI officials
126. THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION IN ACTION: THE EUROPEAN EM-
PLOYMENT AND SocIAL INCLUSION STRATEGIES 274-78 (Jonathan Zeitlin et al.
eds., 2d prtg. 2005).
127. For discussion of the experimentalist potential of this initiative, and
the reasons why it failed, see Grdinne de Btirca, Developing Democracy Beyond
the State, 46 COLuM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 221 (2008). For a similar case concern-
ing the formulation and diffusion of international standards in competition
law, see Yane Svetiev, Partial Formalization of the Regulatory Network (Mar.
1, 2010) (unpublished draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstractid=1 564890.
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and experts-were convinced that they knew the appropriate
solution to the problems of poverty, and practices at the coun-
try-level were dominated by like-minded finance ministries,
without effective participation by other stakeholders who
might have challenged the consensus.128 Hence the "center"
was not much interested in "local" or country-level input, and
did little or nothing to facilitate it; and, aware of this, the par-
ticipation of the "local" or country level was pro forma.
Between the poles of the continuum defined by the ideal-
typical cases of Experimental Governance success on the one
hand and pseudo-Experimentalist failure on the other there
are manifold situations where Experimentalist Governance is
currently developing, has yet either to succeed or to stall, and
could eventually do either. Some of these arise through adap-
tion of Mode One institutions, similar to the path taken by the
CRPD's innovative reconfiguration of the U.N. human rights
regime. Others emerge through the re-assembly of institutions
from Modes One and Two. A development of potentially
broad significance in this connection is an incipient division of
labor between Mode One framework organizations, such as
the WTO, which set out overarching substantive goals, and im-
plementing regimes. The implementing regimes, often with
marked Experimentalist features, establish standards for ac-
tion in particular domains (for instance, protection of various
aspects of the environment in relation to the international
trade regime). 129 The Tuna-Dolphin regime was a forerunner
in creating such a division of labor, and the resolution of the
legal controversies accompanying its development helped es-
tablish its legitimacy. In 1991 a panel of the GATT rejected the
United States' assertion of authority in the MMPA to impose
environmental conditions on the process by which goods such
as tuna are produced outside its sovereign jurisdiction. The
decision, never enforced (not least because of the protests of
environmentalists) was in effect reversed in a 1998 WTO Ap-
pellate Body decision concerning requirements for the use of
shrimp nets designed to protect sea turtles from ensnarement.
In 2012, an Appellate Body decision responding to a Mexican
128. De Burca, supra note 127, at 266-71.
129. See generally MARGARET A. YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE IN-
TERACTION BETWEEN REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (2011) (discussing the
allocation of this responsibility).
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complaint against the restrictive U.S. tuna-labeling regime re-
affirmed the legality under the WTO of environmental restric-
tions on the production of traded goods, provided that the
restrictions conform to standards set by a competent interna-
tional body, open to all potential stakeholders.13 0 Still other
embryonic Experimentalist regimes in the mid-range of the
continuum arise, similar to the model of the Montreal Proto-
col, as deliberate efforts to design institutions adapted to the
prevailing conditions of diversity and uncertainty (and mind-
ful of the division of institutional labor just described). A
prominent example is the commodity roundtables, established
by the World Wildlife Fund, an international environmental
NGO, together with other civil society stakeholders and lead-
ing producers and users of commodities such as palm oil, cot-
ton, sugar, and soy, to establish production standards that pro-
tect the environment, the economic interests of the develop-
ing economies that depend on exporting these commodities,
and the well being of the individuals and communities imme-
diately affected by their production. 31 The extent to which
Mode Three Experimentalist Governance shapes international
organizations depends on what happens in this developing
middle ground; and the next section presents a preliminary
statement of the conditions under which it is likely to flourish
or not.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Conclusion we undertake three tasks: to review Ex-
perimentalism as a mode of governance; to advance, though
not yet to test, some hypotheses about the conditions under
which we would expect Experimentalist Governance to de-
velop in global settings and to be effective; and to discuss the
value of Experimentalist Governance, which we do not see as a
130. See generally Gregory Shaffer, The WTO Tuna-Dolphin H1 Case: United
States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products, 107 Am. J. INT'L L. 12-62 (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2176863 (providing
background and analysis of the recent decision).
131. See James Brassett, Ben Richardson & William Smith, Private Experi-
ments in Global Governance: Primary Commodity Roundtables and the Politics of
Deliberation, 4.03 Iwr'L Theory 367 (2012) (discussing the history of the com-
modity roundtables and evaluating their performance against benchmarks
derived from a conception of Experimentalist Governance).
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panacea but which, applied under circumstances to which it is
well-adapted, is normatively appealing.
A. Experimentalism as a Mode of Governance
We have characterized Experimentalist Governance as
Mode Three, distinguished both from governance through tra-
ditionally integrated international regimes (Mode One) and
from a range of more pluralistic arrangements such as those
discussed in the literatures on regime complexes, networks,
and Global Administrative Law (Mode Two). We have defined
the concept of Experimentalist Governance explicitly, empha-
sizing that five distinctive features must all be present:
1. Openness to participation of relevant entities in a
non-hierarchical process of decision making;
2. Articulation of a broadly agreed common problem
and the establishment of a framework understanding
which sets open-ended goals;
3. Implementation and elaboration by lower-level ac-
tors with local or contextualized knowledge;
4. Continuous feedback, reporting, and monitoring;
and
5. Established practices, involving peer review, for
regular reconsideration and revision of rules and
practices.
Our three extensive case studies demonstrate that, in
three global issue areas, the actual governance patterns closely
approximate the Experimentalist Governance ideal-type and
that Experimentalist Governance is a distinct subset or type of
international regime. A key contribution of this Article is to
show that this form of governance is not limited to administra-
tive or regulatory settings in sovereign states, or the historically
unique transnational setting of the European Union, in which
member states have long shared deep cultural and institu-
tional ties, even while retaining formal sovereignty. It can
emerge and flourish in the international order both under the
shadow of power-as with the threat of unilateral action by the
United States in the case of Tuna-Dolphin and the Montreal
Protocol-and without it-as in the case of the CRPD.
780 [Vol. 45:723
20131 NEW MODES OF PLURALIST GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
B. Conditions for Experimentalist Governance
The natural social scientific question about Experimental-
ist Governance is: "Under what conditions does it thrive as a
mode of governance in world politics?" We have not devel-
oped a comprehensive theory to answer this question, but we
have formulated four hypotheses, which we put forward here,
in the spirit of preliminary inquiry as meriting further elabora-
tion and possible testing.
First, we propose as a necessary condition for Experimen-
talist Governance that: Governments are unable to formulate a com-
prehensive set of rules and efficiently and effectively monitor compli-
ance with them. This condition will be met in uncertain and di-
verse environments, where it is difficult for central actors to
foresee the local effects of rules, and where even effective rules
are likely to be undermined by unpredictable changes. In
none of the situations of Experimentalist Governance that we
examine in this paper-involving tuna fishing, the CRPD, or
the regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals-did govern-
ments have the capacity to formulate and monitor detailed
and comprehensive rules sufficient to address the extent and
nature of the problem in question. Thus the increases in un-
certainty and diversity that contributed to the shift from Mode
One to Mode Two forms of international organization, make
the emergence of Experimentalist institutions more likely,
though certainly not inevitable. Another way of stating this
condition is to say that if there is too much formal or (as the
PRSP example shows) informal agreement on cause-effect re-
lationships and desirable strategies, Experimentalist Govern-
ance is unlikely to take hold.
The second condition is the obverse of the first one: Gov-
ernments must not be stymied by a lack of agreement on basic princi-
ples. In the ILO and OMC pseudo-experimentalist cases, for
example, key actors did not agree on the need jointly to inves-
tigate solutions beyond the limits of existing bargains and
compacts. Hence they hindered the collection of local infor-
mation and obstructed effective use of what nonetheless was
collected. In other words, Experimentalist Governance can no
more work if there is too little agreement than if there is too
much. Experimentalist Governance progresses in the "Goldi-
locks Zone"-where there is neither too much nor too little
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
agreement, and the balance, like the temperature of Goldi-
locks' porridge, is 'just right."
A third condition follows from the first two: Civil society
actors must be deeply involved in the politics of the issue. Successful
Experimentalist Governance regimes and practices depend on
extensive and open participation of civil society actors in
agenda setting, revision, and on-going problem solving. The
more uncertain and diverse the setting, the more likely it is
that ground-level actors, such as NGOs and firms, will begin to
identify and solve problems that central, state actors, even in
neo-corporatist concert with peak associations of labor and
capital, ignore or will not address for fear of jeopardizing es-
tablished interests. Increases in uncertainty and diversity also
make it more likely (but of course far from certain) that au-
thorities and interest groups that might otherwise resist the
participation of civil society actors as a check on their discre-
tion will tolerate or even welcome the entry of new players in
recognition of the limits of their own problem-solving capaci-
ties. Hence the cooperation of (newly formed or previously
marginal) civil society actors either as agenda setters or prob-
lem solvers (with the same groups sometimes in both roles)
will normally be indispensable to the success of Experimental-
ist regimes. In the Tuna-Dolphin regime, NGOs sounded the
alarm about the dangers of dolphin sets, and helped move pas-
sage of the MMPA. Fishers and observers placed on boats by
the IATTC identified dangerous practices and helped devise a
workaround. NGOs organized the La Jolla Agreement to stabi-
lize the regime when the flag states were deadlocked. In the
CRPD context, NGOs helped write the rules, including the
novel rules that gave themselves a major role in monitoring
compliance and revising the rules. In the Montreal Protocol,
NGOs played a key role in putting the dangers of ozone deple-
tion before the public, and putting pressure on Congress for a
regulatory response. Firms and associations of firms (the Alli-
ance for Responsible CFC Policy) eventually became propo-
nents of reform, and firms were central participants in the
sectoral working groups that actually devised proposed alter-
natives to ozone depleting substances or ways to substantially
reduce their production and use. The integration of civil soci-
ety actors into Experimentalist regimes as both agenda setters
and problem solvers blurs the distinction between public and
private regulation. It makes this kind of regime more effective
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than typical Mode One and Mode Two regimes in adapting
international agreements to the lessons of local experience.
All this implies as a fourth condition that: the issue must not
be a matter of high politics. In situations where governments are
in direct control of relevant decisions, uncertainty arises from
the strategic interactions of sovereign states, and the costs of
error are very high. Control of nuclear weapons during the
Cold War is the classic example of the situation and the adap-
tive response: detailed treaties, including monitoring regimes
to provide mutual assurance of compliance with their terms.
Issues such as the management of trade and climate change
that have come to be defined as matters of high politics-
global problems to be addressed by binding, global agree-
ments-are, as we noted at the outset, intractable under cur-
rent conditions. There are correspondingly efforts, as part of
the new division of labor between Mode One and Mode Two
institutions, to redefine them as the joint effect of a constella-
tion of regional and sectoral problems. Problems may be de-
fined in general terms at a global level, but responses take
place through specialized local, regional, or international re-
gimes that (on the model of the Montreal Protocol) reset their
goals in light of rigorously evaluated experience, rather than
deriving them from a precisely defined overall target set ex
ante. If this reframing fails, Experimentalist Governance will
not be part of an eventual solution to climate change; if it suc-
ceeds, we expect its success to go hand in hand with the diffu-
sion of Experimentalist regimes. 32
C. Experimentalist Governance: Not a Panacea but Normatively
Promising
Elinor Ostrom was fond of saying that, however valuable
the principles she articulated were for local self-governance,
they were not a panacea for all sorts of collective action
problems.133 Experimentalist Governance is also not a pan-
132. See VICTOR, supra note 116 (criticizing the framing of global climate
change as a currently intractable issue of high politics, advocating a decom-
position of the problem on the lines suggested above, and using the Mon-
treal Protocol as the prototype of the specialized, problem-solving regimes
that would collectively replace global agreement on carbon-emissions reduc-
tion targets and a cap-and-trade system for achieving them).
133. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Marco A. Janssen & John M. Anderies, Going
Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. ScI. U.S. 15176 (2007) (challenging
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acea. Even if suitable in principle and adapted to a given do-
main, Experimentalist Governance is likely to be impractical
or unworkable where key actors are unwilling or reluctant to
cooperate-because they have veto rights over relevant deci-
sions, prefer not to put established interests at risk, or agree
too much on the answers to the questions they pose-and
when it is impossible to place the reluctant parties under the
threat of a "penalty default." As we have seen, penalty defaults
can change parties' preferences by raising the cost to them of
persisting in habitual but ineffective strategies, inducing them
to consider alternatives and thus increasing the chance that
they enter the "Goldilocks" zone where joint exploration of
further possibilities is mutually attractive. So long as the parties
do not face such a penalty, they are free to translate reluctance
to participate in new arrangements into overt or covert ob-
structionism. But note that the "so-long-as" condition is impor-
tant here: As we have seen in the case of the Tuna Dolphin
and Montreal Protocol regimes, new information can mobilize
the public, touching off a cascade of political and administra-
tive responses that can put previously invulnerable parties at
risk of penalty defaults.
Even where key actors embrace Experimentalist Govern-
ance, institutions reflecting its principles could fail because of
unexpected, negative consequences. Experimentalist
processes can be captured by groups with hidden agendas,
hoping to capitalize on processes that give them the ability to
shape agendas or to exercise vetoes at crucial points. The new
forms of transparency created by regular peer review of results
and increased participation of civil society groups presumably
create new obstacles to familiar forms of capture; but they also
presumably create new forms of vulnerability to outside influ-
ence and new opportunities to temper criticism in return for
access to decision makers. More fundamentally, the actors may
mistake their situation and institute Experimentalist processes
on the assumption that there is no comprehensive, analytical
solution to a set of problems, when in fact such a solution ex-
"the presumption that scholars can . . . deduce general solutions to
problems of the overuse of resources"); Elinor Ostrom, The Challenges of
Achieving Conservation and Development, IV ANN. PROC. WEALTH & WELL-BEING
OF NATIONs 21 (2011) (stating, "[one of the primary challenges in achiev-
ing sustainability is overcoming what I call the 'Panacea Trap.'").
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ists but is unknown to them. In short, human fallibility cuts
very deeply into institutional planning, even in the experimen-
talist mode.
Yet one of the greatest normative merits of Experimental-
ist Governance is that it recognizes human fallibility. Indeed,
its reliance on non-hierarchical decision making and imple-
mentation by local level actors, as well as its provisions for
monitoring, peer review, and revisability, all derive from a
profound awareness of human fallibility. We are often poorly
informed, unwilling to pay costs to produce public goods, and
limited in our analytical ability to predict human behavior, es-
pecially where strategic interactions are involved. In other
words, we may recognize problems but not know how to deal
with them. Under such conditions, Experimentalist Govern-
ance advises that often we should consider establishing a pro-
cess that helps us generate alternatives we might not have
imagined exist and improving our ability to choose among
them by rigorously exposing each to criticism in light of the
others.
A second appealing feature of Experimentalist Govern-
ance, especially in international cooperation, is its potential to
increase participation in, and thus the democratic legitimacy
of, such institutions. A familiar objection to delegation by
treaty of aspects of sovereign authority to international organi-
zations is that the transfer of authority diminishes the scope
for domestic democracy. A rejoinder interprets delegation of
particular sovereign powers to international bodies as a com-
plement and extension of constitutional democracy: Just as the
checks and balances provided by the domestic constitution
and analogous entrenching legislation can improve the quality
of collective self rule, protecting the rights of minorities or
safeguarding diffuse and long-term interests against the imme-
diate power of the majority or concentrated groups, so too can
participation in international regimes. 34 The proviso of
course is that such gains come at the price of limits on impor-
tant forms of democratic participation. So the test of the legiti-
134. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik,
Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT'L ORG. 1 (2009) (arguing that
participation in international institutions can enhance the quality of domes-
tic democracy in several ways including by restricting the power of special
interest factions).
2013] 785
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
macy of constitutional institutions, domestic or international,
is whether the increases in fairness and responsiveness they
provide outweigh the costs they impose on majoritarian rule.
International cooperation organized on the principles of
Experimentalist Governance may reduce the trade-off between
overall responsiveness and democratic participation broadly
conceived. To work, Experimentalist Governance must open
agenda-setting and problem solving to a wide range of actors,
particularly, we have argued, from civil society. Enlarging the
circle of decision making, and keeping it accessible to new par-
ticipants is a condition of success. Moreover, through regular
peer review of the interchange between "central" or frame-
work-making entities and "local" or implementing ones, Ex-
perimentalist Governance requires deliberative justification of
current norms, or their revision, and so induces parties to re-
consider their possibilities and preferences in the light of goals
and procedures they gradually articulate together. In this way,
Experimentalist Governance makes possible a form of forward-
looking or dynamic accountability unavailable in traditional,
principal-agent regimes-regimes which, in any case, are noto-
riously ineffective in international settings, because states can
enter agreements on the basis of a "thin," formal domestic
consensus, and can rarely monitor effectively the regimes thus
authorized.' 3 5 In Experimentalist Governance at its best the
openness of decision-making improves dynamic accountabil-
ity, and improvements in accountability enlarge participation
in decision making. This is neither traditional, representative
democracy, nor counter-majoritarian constitutionalism, but it
is surely a form of deliberative, joint rule making that may con-
tribute in transnational and global contexts, to self-governance
under the rule of law.
135. SeeJoshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 763 (2005) (giving an overview of dynamic accountability);
Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, The Stagnation of Interna-
tional Law 20-21 (Leuven Ctr. for Global Governance Studies, Working Pa-
per No. 97, 2012), available at https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/
working-papers/new-series/wp9l-100/wp-97-pauwelyn-wessel-wouters-revjp.
pdf (discussing the distinction between "thin state consensus" underpinning
many traditional international organization and the "thick stakeholder con-
sensus" supporting international standard-setting bodies with Experimental-
ist features).
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